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Abstract
We study channel resolvability for the discrete memoryless multiple-access channel with cribbing,
i.e., the characterization of the amount of randomness required at the inputs to approximately produce
a chosen i.i.d. output distribution according to Kullback-Leibler divergence. We analyze resolvability
rates when one encoder cribs (i) the input of the other encoder; or the output of the other encoder, (ii)
non-causally, (iii) causally, or (iv) strictly-causally. For scenarios (i)-(iii), we exactly characterize the
channel resolvability region. For (iv), we provide inner and outer bounds for the channel resolvability
region; the crux of our achievability result is to handle the strict causality constraint with a block-Markov
coding scheme in which dependencies across blocks are suitably hidden. Finally, we leverage the channel
resolvability results to derive achievable secrecy rate regions for each of the cribbing scenarios under
strong secrecy constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
Producing an approximation of a desired statistic at a channel output via application of
minimal randomness at its input has emerged as a useful building block for many problems
in information theory, including source coding [1], rate distortion theory [2], coordination [3]
and strong secrecy [4]–[8]. The origins of this problem can be traced back to Wyner’s work [9]
on the characterization of common randomness among two dependent random variables, in
which he used a normalized Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence as a measure of approximation.
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2The problem was subsequently formalized and generalized for total variation using information-
spectrum methods [10] and the optimal amount of randomness was called channel resolvability.
Subsequent works have simplified proofs, both for total variation [3] and KL divergence [11],
and studied multi-user settings, such as multiple-access channels (MACs) with non-cooperative
encoders [12]–[15].
This paper studies the channel resolvability region for discrete memoryless multiple-access
channels (MACs) with cooperating encoders; specifically, we focus on a cribbing model [16]
in which one encoder has access to the input or output of the other encoder subject to various
causality constraints. The cribbing model captures the essence of cooperation and produces results
and insights that are independent of cooperation signaling mechanisms. A key contribution of this
paper is the characterization of the channel resolvability region for four cribbing situations while
approximating the output distribution according to non-normalized KL divergence: (i) degraded
message sets, (ii) non-causal cribbing, (iii) causal cribbing and (iv) strictly-causal cribbing.
In the case of non-causal cribbing, an achievability region is already available from [3,
Corollary VII.8] for approximation in terms of total variation, in which case our contribution
is only to derive an achievability and matching converse for KL divergence. In the case of
causal and strictly-causal cribbing, we not only develop converse results but also propose an
achievability scheme that handles the causality constraints with a block-Markov coding scheme;
in particular, we show that the dependencies created by the block-Markov coding scheme can be
hidden through appropriate recycling of secret randomness after identifying a wiretap channel
embedded in the model.
In the second part of this paper, strong secrecy [17], [18] achievable rates are obtained for the
MAC with cribbing. We develop a wiretap coding scheme that achieves strong secrecy, fueled by
the results in the earlier part of this paper on the resolvability of cribbing MAC. The secrecy rates
for MAC with degraded message sets as well as non-causal cribbing follow from corresponding
resolvability results without complication. However, a novel approach is needed for the causal
and strictly causal cribbing, because the cribbing MAC codebook devised by Willems and van
der Muelen [16] is not directly compatible with the randomness recycling in the resolvability
codebooks under causality constraints. Accordingly, a notable contribution of this work is a new
superposition coding strategy that uses all components of the cribbing signal for cooperation to
achieve efficient decoding at the legitimate receiver, while at the same time forcing a part of
the randomness within the cribbing signal to remain non-cooperative from the viewpoint of the
November 29, 2018 DRAFT
3(a) Degraded message sets MAC (b) Non-causal cribbing MAC
(c) Strictly-causal cribbing MAC (d) Causal cribbing MAC
Fig. 1. Cribbing MAC scenarios
eavesdropper. This feature is needed for randomness recycling and is crucial to avoid secrecy
rate loss under strictly causal and causal cribbing.
Strong secrecy for MAC with non-cooperating encoders has been studied in [13]–[15].
To the best of our knowledge, strong secrecy in multi-terminal settings under cooperating
encoders has not been comprehensively studied. For completeness we highlight examples of the
investigation of weak secrecy under cooperation: MAC with cooperating or partially cooperating
encoders [19]–[22], interference channel with cooperating encoders [23]–[25], relay channel
with an external eavesdropper [26], [27] and broadcast channel with cooperating receivers [28].
These works follow the classical approach of Wyner [29] and Csiszár [30] to develop weak
secrecy results. To the best of our understanding there has been limited work on any type of
cooperative strong secrecy; notable examples are Goldfeld et al. [7] on receive side cooperation
in the broadcast channel, Watanabe and Oohama [31] on the cognitive interference channel with
confidential messages, and Chou and Yener [32] on Polar coding for the MAC wiretap channel
with cooperative jamming.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II clarifies our notation, Section III
introduces the problem definition and presents the main resolvability results of the paper,
Section V produces the resolvability proofs, and Section IV presents the strong secrecy results.
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4II. NOTATION
Random variables are represented by upper case letters and their realizations by the cor-
responding lower case letters, e.g., x is a realization of the random variable X . Superscripts
denote the length of a sequence of symbols and subscripts denote the position of a symbol
in a sequence. Calligraphic letters represent sets, the cardinality of which is denoted by | · |.
For example, Xn = {X1, . . . , Xn} where Xi belongs to the alphabet X of size |X |. PX and
PXY denote probability distributions on X and X × Y , respectively. We sometimes omit the
subscripts in probability distributions if they are clear from the context, i.e., we write P (x)
instead of PX(x).
For two distributions P and Q on the same alphabet, the KL divergence is defined
by D(P‖Q) ,
∑
x P (x) log
P (x)
Q(x)
and the variational distance is defined by V(P,Q) ,∑
x |P (x)−Q(x)|. Throughout the paper, log denotes the base 2 logarithm. For an i.i.d. vector
whose components are distributed according to PX , the product distribution is denoted by
P⊗nX (x
n) ,
∏n
i=1 PX(xi). The set of ǫ-strongly-typical sequences of length n with respect to PX
is defined as:
T nǫ (PX) ,
{
xn :
∣∣∣∣N(a|xn)n − PX(a)
∣∣∣∣ 6 ǫPX(a), ∀a ∈ X}.
For a set of random variables {Xi}i∈M indexed over a countable set M, E\m(·) denotes the
expectation over all random variables with indices in M except that with index m. EM(·) is the
expectation w.r.t. the random variable M and 1{·} is the indicator function.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND MAIN RESULTS
A. Problem Definition: Channel Resolvability of MAC with Cribbing
We consider four scenarios for the two-user discrete memoryless MAC with cribbing
(see Fig. 1). The discrete memoryless MAC (X1 × X2,WZ|X1,X2,Z) consists of finite input
alphabets X1 and X2, and finite output alphabet Z , together with a channel transition probability
WZ|X1X2 . For a joint input distribution PX1,X2 on X1×X2, the output is distributed according to
QZ(z) =
∑
x1,x2
PX1,X2(x1, x2)WZ|X1,X2(z|x1, x2). A (2
nR1 , 2nR2, n) channel resolvability code
consists of two encoders f1 and f2 with inputs M1 and M2 defined on M1 = J1, 2
nR1K and
M2 = J1, 2
nR2K. In the four scenarios studied in this paper, the per-symbol encoding functions
are defined as follows.
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5In the MAC with degraded message sets (Fig. 1(a)), Encoder 2 has access to the input of
Encoder 1
f1i :M1 → X1 f2i :M1 ×M2 → X2. (1)
In the MAC with non-causal cribbing (Fig. 1(b)), Encoder 2 has non-causal access to the entire
current codeword of Encoder 1
f1i :M1 → X1 f2i :M2 × X
n
1 → X2. (2)
In the MAC with strictly-causal cribbing (Fig. 1(c)), Encoder 2 has access to the output of
Encoder 1 with a one-symbol delay
f1i :M1 → X1 f2i :M2 × X
i−1 → X2. (3)
In the MAC with causal cribbing (Fig. 1(d)), Encoder 2 has access to the output of Encoder 1
with zero delay
f1i :M1 → X1 f2i :M2 × X
i
1 → X2. (4)
Definition 1. A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable for the discrete memoryless MAC
(X1×X2,WZ|X1X2 ,Z) if for a given
1 QZ there exists a sequence of (2
nR1, 2nR2 , n) codes such that
limn→∞D
(
PZn‖Q
⊗n
Z
)
= 0. The MAC resolvability region is the closure of the set of achievable
rate pairs (R1, R2).
B. Statement of Main Results
We first recall the known MAC resolvability region with non-cooperating encoders, which
will serve as a reference to assess the benefits of cooperation.
Theorem 1 ( [13]). The resolvability region for the MAC with non-cooperating encoders is the
set of rate pairs (R1, R2) such that
R1 > I(X1;Z|V ), (5)
R2 > I(X2;Z|V ), (6)
R1 +R2 > I(X1, X2;Z|V ), (7)
1Originally in [10] the resolvability rate was defined as “the number of random bits required per channel use in order to
generate an input that achieves arbitrarily accurate approximation of the output statistics for any given input process.” More
recent works consider a fixed but arbitrary QZ , leaving out the implied intersection of rate regions over different QZ . This is
more convenient in several ways, including in the application of resolvability to secrecy problems where only the simulation of
a certain QZ is of interest.
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6for some joint distribution PV X1X2Z , PV PX1|V PX2|VWZ|X1X2 with marginal QZ .
The resolvability region in [13] was derived with respect to variational distance approximation.
Theorem 2. The resolvability region for the MAC with degraded message sets is the set of rate
pairs (R1, R2) such that
R1 > I(X1;Z), (8)
R1 +R2 > I(X1, X2;Z), (9)
for some joint distribution PX1X2Z , PX1X2WZ|X1X2 with marginal QZ .
Proof. See Section V-A.
The absence of the individual rate constraint R2 is a direct consequence of the degraded
message model that allows Encoder 2 to benefit from the randomness provided via R1, reducing
the required individual rate constraint for User 2 to R2 ≥ 0, which is omitted. Another difference
between the regions described by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 is that the former includes a
convexifying auxiliary random variable that is missing in the latter. The region described by
Theorem 2 is already convex due to the larger set of available input distributions, as proved in
Appendix A-A.
Theorem 3. The resolvability region for the MAC with non-causal cribbing is the set of rate
pairs (R1, R2) such that
R1 > I(X1;Z), (10)
R2 > I(X1, X2;Z)−H(X1), (11)
R1 +R2 > I(X1, X2;Z), (12)
for some joint distribution PX1X2Z , PX1X2WZ|X1X2 with marginal QZ .
Proof. See Section V-B.
The achievability result was derived in [3, Corollary VII.8] for approximation of the output
statistics in terms of variational distance. Our contribution here is to provide achievability and
converse proofs for approximation in terms of KL divergence. Compared with the MAC with
degraded message sets, more randomness is required as seen by the presence of an individual
rate constraint for User 2. As already discussed in [3], this stems from the impossibility for
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7Encoder 2 to extract uniform randomness from the observation of the output of Encoder 1 at a
rate exceeding H(X1). This rate region is convex (see Appendix A-B).
Theorem 4. The resolvability region for the MAC with strictly-causal cribbing is included in
the set of rate pairs (R1, R2) such that
R1 > I(U,X1;Z), (13)
R2 > I(X1, X2;Z)−H(X1|U), (14)
R1 +R2 > I(X1, X2;Z), (15)
for some joint distribution PUX1X2Z , PUPX1|UPX2|UWZ|X1X2 with marginal QZ . An achievable
region is characterized by the same rate constraints and distribution, but subject to the additional
constraint H(X1|U) > I(U,X1;Z).
Proof. See Section V-C.
The strict causality constraint leads to the appearance of a new random variable U in several
terms in the right hand side of the individual rate constraints, thus the individual rate constraints
can be larger than Theorem 3, i.e., more needed randomness. The achievable region provided by
Theorem 4 does not provably match the outer bound because the set of probability distributions
available in the achievable region is smaller than in the converse, due to the additional constraint
H(X1|U) > I(U,X1;Z). The rate regions defined by the inner and outer bounds are convex
(see Appendix A-C).
Theorem 5. The resolvability region for the MAC with causal cribbing is the set of rate pairs
(R1, R2) such that
R1 > I(X1;Z) (16)
R2 > I(X1, X2;Z)−H(X1) (17)
R1 +R2 > I(X1, X2;Z) (18)
for some joint distribution PX1X2Z , PX1X2WZ|X1X2 with marginal QZ .
Proof. See Section V-D.
Similar to what was observed for the MAC reliability region [16], the MAC resolvability
region with causal cribbing is identical to that obtained for non-causal cribbing.
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8Remark 1. Theorem 5 is established from Theorem 4 using Shannon strategies as in [16], yet
Theorem 5 has an achievable region that is tight against the outer bound when Theorem 4 does
not. Perhaps surprisingly, this happens because the choice of random variables in the Shannon
strategy automatically satisfies the constraint imposed in the achievability of Theorem 4.
IV. STRONG SECRECY FROM CHANNEL RESOLVABILITY
In this section we use the resolvability results to study the multiple-access wiretap channel
with cribbing. For each of the cribbing models previously discussed, an achievable strong secrecy
rate region is presented. Consider a MAC with cribbing (X1×X2,WZ|X1,X2 ,Y ,Z) where X1 and
X2 are finite input alphabets, Y and Z are the finite output alphabets of the legitimate receiver
and the wiretapper, respectively. A (2nR1 , 2nR2, n) code consists of two encoders f1 and f2 and
a decoder g. The encoders are defined similar to (1)-(4) but the functions f1i and f2i are now
stochastic and not deterministic. The decoding function at the legitimate receiver is defined as:
g : Yn → Mˆ1 × Mˆ2. (19)
The probability of error at the legitimate receiver is defined as P
(n)
e = P
(
(Mˆ1, Mˆ2) 6=
(M1,M2)
)
. The strong secrecy metric adopted in this paper is the total amount of leaked
confidential information per codeword, defined as L(n) = I(M1,M2;Z
n).
Definition 2. A strong secrecy rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable for the discrete
memoryless MAC (X1 × X2,WZ|X1X2 ,Y ,Z) if there exists a sequence of (2
nR1, 2nR2 , n) codes
such that P
(n)
e and L
(n) vanish as n→∞.
Proposition 1. For the multiple-access wiretap channel with degraded message sets, the following
strong-secrecy rate region is achievable:
(R1, R2) =
⋃
PX1X2WY Z|X1X2
R
(in)
DM,
R
(in)
DM =

R1, R2 > 0
R2 6 I(X2; Y |X1)
R1 +R2 6 I(X1, X2; Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)
 . (20)
Proof. See Appendix C-A.
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9Proposition 2. For the multiple-access wiretap channel with non-causal cribbing, the following
strong-secrecy rate region is achievable:
(R1, R2) =
⋃
PX1X2WY Z|X1X2
R
(in)
NC ,
R
(in)
NC =

R1, R2 > 0
R1 6 H(X1)− I(X1;Z)
R2 6 I(X2; Y |X1)
R1 +R2 6 I(X1, X2; Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)

. (21)
Proof. See Appendix C-B.
Proposition 3. For the multiple-access wiretap channel with strictly-causal cribbing, the
following strong-secrecy rate region is achievable:
(R1, R2) =
⋃
PUPX1|UPX2|UWY Z|X1X2
R
(in)
SC ,
R
(in)
SC =

R1, R2 > 0
R1 6 H(X1|U)− I(U,X1;Z)
R2 6 I(X2; Y |X1, U)
R1 +R2 6 H(X1|U) + I(X2; Y |X1, U)− I(X1, X2;Z)
R1 +R2 6 I(X1, X2; Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)

. (22)
Proof. See Appendix C-C.
Remark 2. Recall the resolvability achievable rate region under the strictly causal cribbing had
a constraint H(X1|U) > I(U,X1;Z) on the allowable probability distributions. This constraint
is implicit in Proposition 3 in the form of the non-negativity constraint on R1.
Proposition 4. For the multiple-access wiretap channel with causal cribbing, the following
strong-secrecy rate region is achievable:
(R1, R2) =
⋃
PX1X2WY Z|X1X2
R
(in)
C ,
November 29, 2018 DRAFT
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R
(in)
C =

R1, R2 > 0
R1 6 H(X1)− I(X1;Z)
R2 6 I(X2; Y |X1)
R1 +R2 6 I(X1, X2; Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)

. (23)
Proof. See Appendix C-D.
V. PROOFS OF MAIN RESULTS
A. Theorem 2: MAC with Degraded Message Sets
1) Achievability:
Consider a distribution P (x1, x2) = P (x1)P (x2|x1) such that
∑
x1,x2
P (x1, x2)W (z|x1, x2) =
QZ(z).
• Independently generate 2nR1 codewords xn1 each with probability P (x
n
1 ) = P
⊗n
X1
(xn1 ). Label
them xn1 (m1), m1 ∈ J1, 2
nR1K.
• For every m1, independently generate 2
nR2 codewords xn2 each with probability
P (xn2 |x
n
1 (m1)) = P
⊗n
X2|X1
(xn2 |x
n
1 (m1)). Label them x
n
2 (m1, m2), m2 ∈ J1, 2
nR2K.
For m1 ∈ J1, 2
nR1K and m2 ∈ J1, 2
nR2K, let Xn1 (m1) and X
n
2 (m1, m2) denote the random
variables representing the randomly generated codewords. The average KL divergence is:
E
(
D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z )
)
= E
(∑
zn
PZn(z
n) log
PZn(z
n)
Q⊗nZ (z
n)
)
= E
(∑
zn
1
2n(R1+R2)
∑
m1
∑
m2
W⊗n(zn|Xn1 (m1), X
n
2 (m1, m2))
log
∑
m′1
∑
m′2
W⊗n(zn|Xn1 (m
′
1), X
n
2 (m
′
1, m
′
2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
)
(a)
6
1
2n(R1+R2)
∑
m1
∑
m2
∑
zn
∑
xn1 (m1)
∑
xn2 (m1,m2)
P (xn1 (m1), x
n
2 (m1, m2), z
n)
logE\(m1,m2)
∑
m′1
∑
m′2
W⊗n(zn|Xn1 (m
′
1), X
n
2 (m
′
1, m
′
2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
=
1
2n(R1+R2)
∑
m1
∑
m2
∑
zn
∑
xn1 (m1)
∑
xn2 (m1,m2)
P (xn1 (m1), x
n
2 (m1, m2), z
n)
November 29, 2018 DRAFT
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logE\(m1,m2)
(
W⊗n(zn|xn1 (m1), x
n
2 (m1, m2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
+
∑
m′2 6=m2
W⊗n(zn|xn1 (m1), X
n
2 (m1, m
′
2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
+
∑
m′1 6=m1
∑
m′2
W⊗n(zn|Xn1 (m
′
1), X
n
2 (m
′
1, m
′
2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
)
6
1
2n(R1+R2)
∑
m1
∑
m2
∑
zn
∑
xn1 (m1)
∑
xn2 (m1,m2)
P⊗n(xn1 (m1), x
n
2 (m1, m2), z
n)
log
(
W⊗n(zn|xn1 (m1), x
n
2 (m1, m2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
+
∑
m′2 6=m2
P⊗n(zn|xn1 (m1))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
+ 1
)
(24)
where (a) follows by Jensen’s inequality. We finally write the right-hand side of (24) as Ψ1+Ψ2
with
Ψ1 ,
1
2n(R1+R2)
∑
m1
∑
m2
∑
(xn1 ,x
n
2 ,z
n)∈T nǫ (PX1,X2,Z)
P⊗n(xn1 (m1), x
n
2 (m1, m2), z
n)
log
(
W⊗n(zn|xn1 (m1), x
n
2 (m1, m2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
+
∑
m′2 6=m2
P⊗n(zn|xn1 (m1))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
+ 1
)
6 log
( 2−n(1−ǫ)H(Z|X1,X2)
2n(R1+R2)2−n(1+ǫ)H(Z)
+
2nR22−n(1−ǫ)H(Z|X1)
2n(R1+R2)2−n(1+ǫ)H(Z)
+ 1
)
6 log
(
2−n(R1+R2−I(X1,X2;Z)−2ǫH(Z)) + 2−n(R1−I(X1;Z)−2ǫH(Z)) + 1
)
and
Ψ2 ,
1
2n(R1+R2)
∑
m1
∑
m2
∑
(xn1 ,x
n
2 ,z
n)/∈T nǫ (PX1,X2,Z)
P⊗n(xn1 (m1), x
n
2 (m1, m2), z
n)
log
(
W⊗n(zn|xn1 (m1), x
n
2 (m1, m2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
+
∑
m′2 6=m2
P⊗n(zn|xn1 (m1))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
+ 1
)
6 2|X1||X2||Z|e
−nǫ2µX1X2Zn log(
2
µZ
+ 1)
where
µZ = min
z∈Z
s.t. Q(z)>0
Q(z)
µX1X2Z = min
(x1,x2,z)∈(X1,X2,Z)
s.t. Q(x1,x2,z)>0
Q(x1, x2, z)
Combining the bounds on Ψ1 and Ψ2 we obtain E(D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z )) → 0 exponentially with n if
R1 > I(X1;Z) + 2ǫH(Z) and R1 + R2 > I(X1, X2;Z) + 2ǫH(Z). This implies, by Markov’s
inequality, that Pr(D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z ) > ηn)
n→∞
−−−→ 0 for a suitable choice of ηn; ηn = e
−nα for α > 0.
2) Converse:
By assumption,
ǫ > D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z )
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12
=
∑
zn
P (zn) log
P (zn)
Q⊗nZ (z
n)
=
n∑
i=1
(∑
zi
PZ(zi) log
1
Q(zi)
−H(Zi|Z
i−1)
)
(a)
>
n∑
i=1
(∑
zi
P (zi) log
1
Q(zi)
−H(Zi)
)
=
n∑
i=1
D(PZi||QZ)
(b)
> nD(P˜Z ||QZ)
where (a) follows because conditioning does not increase entropy and (b) follows by Jensen’s
Jensen’s inequality and the convexity of D(·||·) with P˜Z(z) , 1n
∑n
i=1 PZi(z). First, note that
nR1 = H(M1) (25)
> I(M1;Z
n)
(a)
= I(M1, X
n
1 ;Z
n)
> I(Xn1 ;Z
n)
= I(Xn1 , X
n
2 ;Z
n)− I(Xn2 ;Z
n|Xn1 )
(b)
>
∑
xn1
∑
xn2
∑
zn
P (xn1 , x
n
2 , z
n) log
W⊗n(zn|xn1 , x
n
2 )
PZn(zn)
−
∑
i
I(X2i;Zi|X1i)
=
∑
xn1
∑
xn2
∑
zn
P (xn1 , x
n
2 , z
n) log
W⊗n(zn|xn1 , x
n
2 )
Q⊗nZ (z
n)
− D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z )−
∑
i
I(X2i;Zi|X1i)
>
∑
xn1
∑
xn2
∑
zn
P (xn1 , x
n
2 , z
n) log
W⊗n(zn|xn1 , x
n
2 )
Q⊗nZ (z
n)
−
∑
i
I(X2i;Zi|X1i)− ǫ
=
∑
i
∑
x1i
∑
x2i
∑
zi
P (x1i, x2i, zi)
(
log
W (zi|x1i, x2i)
Q(zi)
− log
W (zi|x1i, x2i)
P (zi|x1i)
)
− ǫ
=
∑
i
∑
x1i
∑
x2i
∑
zi
P (x1i, x2i, zi) log
P (zi|x1i)
Q(zi)
− ǫ
=
∑
i
∑
x1i
∑
zi
P (x1i, zi) log
P (zi|x1i)
Q(zi)
− ǫ
=
∑
i
D(PX1iZi ||PX1iQZi)− ǫ
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(c)
> nD
(∑
i PX1iZi
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑i PX1in QZ
)
− ǫ
(d)
= nD(P˜X1,Z ||P˜X1QZ)− ǫ
= n
∑
x1
∑
z
P˜X1,Z(x1, z) log
P˜X1,Z(x1, z)
P˜X1(x1)QZ(z)
− ǫ
= n
∑
x1
∑
z
P˜X1,Z(x1, z) log
P˜X1,Z(x1, z)
P˜X1(x1)P˜Z(z)
+ n
∑
x1
∑
z
P˜X1,Z(x1, z) log
P˜Z(z)
QZ(z)
− ǫ
= nI(X˜1; Z˜) + nD(P˜Z ||QZ)− ǫ
> nI(X˜1; Z˜)− ǫ (26)
where
(a) follows from the definition of the deterministic encoding functions in (1);
(b) follows because conditioning does not increase entropy and the channel is discrete
memoryless, therefore I(Xn2 ;Z
n|Xn1 ) =
∑
H(Zi|Z
i−1, Xn1 ) − H(Zi|Z
i−1, Xn1 , X
n
2 ) 6∑
H(Zi|X1i)−H(Zi|X1i, X2i) 6
∑n
i=1 I(X2i;Zi|X1i);
(c) follows by Jensen’s inequality and the convexity of D(·||·);
(d) follows by defining P˜X1,Z(x1, z) ,
1
n
∑
i PX1i,Zi(x1, z) and P˜X1(x1) ,
1
n
∑
i PX1i(x1) where
P˜X1,X2(x1, x2) ,
1
n
∑
i PX1i,X2i(x1, x2), P˜X1,X2,Z(x1, x2, z) ,
1
n
∑
i PX1i,X2i,Zi(x1, x2, z) =
WZ|X1,X2(z|x1, x2)P˜X1,X2(x1, x2) and P˜X1,Z(x1, z) =
∑
x2
P˜X1,X2,Z(x1, x2, z) .
Next, observe that
n(R1 +R2)
= H(M1,M2) (27)
> I(M1,M2;Z
n)
> I(Xn1 , X
n
2 ;Z
n) + D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z )− ǫ
=
∑
xn1
∑
xn2
∑
zn
P (xn1 , x
n
2 , z
n) log
P (xn1 , x
n
2 , z
n)
P (xn1 , x
n
2 )PZn(z
n)
+
∑
zn
P (zn) log
PZn(z
n)
Q⊗nZ (z
n)
− ǫ
=
∑
xn1
∑
xn2
∑
zn
P (xn1 , x
n
2 , z
n) log
W⊗n(zn|xn1 , x
n
2 )
Q⊗nZ (z
n)
− ǫ
=
∑
i
∑
x1i
∑
x2i
∑
zi
P (x1i, x2i, zi) log
W (zi|x1i, x2i)
Q(zi)
− ǫ
=
∑
i
D(PX1i,X2i,Zi||PX1i,X2iQZi)− ǫ
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(a)
> nD
(∑
i PX1i,X2i,Zi
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑i PX1i,X2in QZ
)
− ǫ
(b)
= nD(P˜X1,X2,Z ||P˜X1,X2QZ)− ǫ
= nD(P˜X1,X2,Z||P˜X1,X2P˜Z) + nD(P˜Z ||QZ)− ǫ
> nI(X˜1, X˜2; Z˜)− ǫ (28)
where
(a) follows by Jensen’s inequality and the convexity of D(·||·);
(b) follows by defining P˜X1,X2,Z(x1, x2, z) ,
1
n
∑
i PX1i,X2i,Zi(x1, x2, z) and P˜X1,X2(x1, x2) ,
1
n
∑
i PX1i,X2i(x1, x2) with P˜X1,X2,Z(x1, x2, z) = WZ|X1,X2(z|x1, x2)P˜X1,X2(x1, x2, z).
The final step of this converse proof, and other converse proofs in this paper, is to show the
continuity of the resolvability region at ǫ→ 0. For a proof of this statement, we refer the reader
to [3, Section VI.C], which can be extended to a MAC.
B. Theorem 3: MAC with Non-Causal Cribbing
1) Achievability:
Consider a distribution P (x1, x2) = P (x1)P (x2|x1) such that
∑
x1,x2
P (x1, x2)W (z|x1, x2) =
QZ(z).
• Independently generate 2nR1 codewords xn1 each with probability P (x
n
1 ) = P
⊗n
X1
(xn1 ). Label
them xn1 (m1), m1 ∈ J1, 2
nR1K.
• For every xn1 (m1), independently generate 2
nR2 codewords xn2 each with probability
P (xn2 |x
n
1 (m1)) = P
⊗n
X2|X1
(xn2 |x
n
1 (m1)). Label them x
n
2 (x
n
1 (m1), m2), m2 ∈ J1, 2
nR2K.
Unlike the case of degraded message sets, here the codewords xn2 are a function of x
n
1 (m1)
instead of m1. For m1 ∈ J1, 2
nR1K and m2 ∈ J1, 2
nR2K, let Xn1 (m1) and X
n
2 (X
n
1 (m1), m2) denote
random variables representing the randomly generated codewords. The average KL divergence
is:
E
(
D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z )
)
= E
(∑
zn
PZn(z
n) log
PZn(z
n)
Q⊗nZ (z
n)
)
= E
(∑
zn
∑
m1,m2
W⊗n(zn|Xn1 (m1), X
n
2 (X
n
1 (m1), m2))
2n(R1+R2)
log
∑
m′1,m
′
2
W⊗n(zn|Xn1 (m
′
1), X
n
2 (X
n
1 (m
′
1), m
′
2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
)
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(a)
6
1
2n(R1+R2)
∑
m1,m2
∑
zn
∑
xn1 (m1)
∑
xn2 (x
n
1 (m1),m2)
P (xn1 (m1), x
n
2 (x
n
1 (m1), m2), z
n)
logE\(m1,m2)
∑
m′1,m
′
2
W⊗n(zn|Xn1 (m
′
1), X
n
2 (X
n
1 (m
′
1), m
′
2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
=
1
2n(R1+R2)
∑
m1,m2
∑
zn
∑
xn1 (m1)
∑
xn2 (x
n
1 (m1),m2)
P (xn1(m1), x
n
2 (x
n
1 (m1), m2), z
n)
logE\(m1,m2)
(
W⊗n(zn|xn1 (m1), x
n
2 (x
n
1 (m1), m2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
+
∑
m′1 6=m1
[
1{xn1 (m
′
1)=x
n
1 (m1)}
W⊗n(zn|Xn1 (m
′
1), x
n
2 (X
n
1 (m
′
1), m2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
+ 1{xn1 (m′1)6=xn1 (m1)}
W⊗n(zn|Xn1 (m
′
1), x
n
2 (X
n
1 (m
′
1), m2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
]
+
∑
m′2 6=m2
W⊗n(zn|xn1 (m1), X
n
2 (x
n
1 (m1), m
′
2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
+
∑
m′2 6=m2
m′1 6=m1
W⊗n(zn|Xn1 (m
′
1), X
n
2 (X
n
1 (m
′
1), m
′
2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
)
6
1
2n(R1+R2)
∑
m1,m2
∑
zn
∑
xn1 (m1)
∑
xn2 (x
n
1 (m1),m2)
P (xn1 (m1), x
n
2 (x
n
1 (m1), m2), z
n)
log
(
W⊗n(zn|xn1 (m1), x
n
2 (x
n
1 (m1), m2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
+ E\(m1,m2)
( ∑
m′1 6=m1
[
1{xn1 (m
′
1)=x
n
1 (m1)}
W⊗n(zn|Xn1 (m
′
1), X
n
2 (X
n
1 (m
′
1), m2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
+ 1{xn1 (m′1)6=xn1 (m1)}
W⊗n(zn|Xn1 (m
′
1), X
n
2 (X
n
1 (m
′
1), m2))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
])
+
∑
m′2 6=m2
P⊗n(zn|xn1 (m1))
2n(R1+R2)Q⊗nZ (z
n)
+ 1
)
(29)
(b)
= Ψ1 +Ψ2
where
(a) follows by Jensen’s inequality;
(b) similar to the MAC with degraded message sets, Ψ1 is taking the summation
∑
xn1 ,x
n
2 ,z
n in (29)
over (xn1 , x
n
2 , z
n) ∈ T nǫ (PX1,X2,Z) and Ψ2 is taking the same summation over (x
n
1 , x
n
2 , z
n) 6∈
T nǫ (PX1,X2,Z).
November 29, 2018 DRAFT
16
Hence,
Ψ1 6 log
(
2−n(R1+R2)2−n(1−ǫ)H(Z|X1,X2)2n(1+ǫ)H(Z) + 2−nR22−n(1−ǫ)(H(X1)+H(Z|X1,X2))2n(1+ǫ)H(Z)
+ 2−nR2 + 2−nR12−n(1−ǫ)(H(Z|X1))2n(1+ǫ)H(Z) + 1
)
(30)
Now E(D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z ))
n→∞
−−−→ 0 if R1 > I(X1;Z) + 2ǫH(Z), R2 > I(X1, X2;Z)−H(X1) +
2ǫH(Z) and R1 +R2 > I(X1, X2;Z) + 2ǫH(Z).
2) Converse:
By assumption similar to the degraded message set MAC, ǫ > D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z ) > nD(P˜Z ||QZ)
with P˜Z(z) , 1n
∑n
i=1 PZi(z). The proofs for the rate R1 and the sum rate R1 +R2 are similar
to the MAC with degraded message sets case by repeating the steps in (25)-(26) and (27)-(28)
respectively. So we will proceed by presenting the proof for the rate R2,
Note that
nR2 = H(M2)
> H(M2|X
n
1 )
> I(M2;Z
n|Xn1 )
(a)
= I(M2, X
n
2 ;Z
n|Xn1 )
> I(Xn2 ;Z
n|Xn1 )
= I(Xn1 , X
n
2 ;Z
n)− I(Xn1 ;Z
n)
=
∑
xn1
∑
xn2
∑
zn
P (xn1 , x
n
2 , z
n) log
P (xn1 , x
n
2 , z
n)
P (xn1 , x
n
2 )PZn(z
n)
−H(Xn1 ) +H(X
n
1 |Z
n)
>
∑
xn1
∑
xn2
∑
zn
P (xn1 , x
n
2 , z
n) log
W⊗n(zn|xn1 , x
n
2 )
Q⊗nZ (z
n)
− D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z )−H(X
n
1 )
>
∑
i
∑
x1i
∑
x2i
∑
zi
P (x1i, x2i, zi) log
W (zi|x1i, x2i)
Q(zi)
−
∑
i
H(X1i)− ǫ
=
∑
i
D(PX1i,X2i,Zi||PX1i,X2iQZi)−
∑
i
H(X1i)− ǫ
(b)
> nD(P˜X1,X2,Z||P˜X1,X2QZ)− nH(X˜1)− ǫ
= nD(P˜X1,X2,Z||P˜X1,X2P˜Z) + D(P˜Z||QZ)− nH(X˜1)− ǫ
> nI(X˜1, X˜2; Z˜)− nH(X˜1)− ǫ
where
(a) follows from the definition of the deterministic encoding functions in (2);
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(b) follows by Jensen’s inequality, the convexity of D(·||·), concavity of H(·) and defining
P˜X1,X2,Z(x1, x2, z) ,
1
n
∑
i PX1i,X2i,Zi(x1, x2, z) and P˜X1,X2(x1, x2) ,
1
n
∑
i PX1i,X2i(x1, x2)
with P˜X1,X2,Z(x1, x2, z) = WZ|X1,X2(z|x1, x2)P˜X1,X2(x1, x2).
To conclude the converse proof, we again refer the reader to [3, Section VI.C] for the continuity
of the resolvability region at ǫ→ 0.
C. Theorem 4: MAC with Strictly-Causal Cribbing
1) Achievability:
To handle the strict causality constraint, we adopt a block-Markov encoding scheme over
B > 0 consecutive and dependent blocks, each consisting of r transmissions such that
n = rB. The vector of n channel outputs Zn at the channel output may then be described
as Zn , (Zr1 , · · · , Z
r
B), where each Z
r
b for b ∈ J1, BK describes the observations in block b. The
distribution induced by the coding scheme is the joint distribution P nZ , PZr1 ,··· ,PZrB
, while the
target output distributions is a product distribution of product distributions Q⊗nZ ,
∏B
j=1Q
⊗r
Z .
Notice that
D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z ) = D(PZr1 ...ZrB ||Q
⊗rB
Z )
=
B∑
j=1
D(PZrj |Z
B,r
j+1
||Q⊗rZ |PZB,rj+1
)
=
B∑
j=1
D(PZrj ||Q
⊗r
Z ) +
B∑
j=1
D(PZrj |Z
B,r
j+1
||PZrj |PZB,rj+1
)
=
B∑
j=1
D(PZrj ||Q
⊗r
Z ) +
B∑
j=1
I(Zrj ;Z
B,r
j+1) (31)
where Z
B,r
j+1 = {Z
r
j+1, . . . Z
r
B}. This suggests that to achieve D(P
n
Z ||Q
⊗n
Z )
n→∞
−−−→ 0, we may
enforce ∀j = {1, ..., B} both D(PZrj ||Q
⊗r
Z )
r→∞
−−−→ 0 and I(Zrj ;Z
B,r
j+1)
r→∞
−−−→ 0 sufficiently fast
with r. As shown next, we achieve this by constructing a code that approximates Q⊗rZ in every
block and show that the dependencies across blocks, created by block-Markov coding, can be
eliminated by suitably recycling randomness from one block to the next.
Consider a distribution PUX1X2Z = PUPX1|UPX2|UWZ|X1X2 with marginal QZ that satisfies
H(X1|U) > I(UX1;Z). For every block b ∈ J1, BK:
• Independently generate 2rρ0 codewords according to P⊗rU and label them u
r(m
(b)
0 ), where
m
(b)
0 ∈ J1, 2
rρ0K.
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Fig. 2. Codebook structure at both users.
• For every m
(b)
0 , independently generate 2
r(ρ1+ρ2) codewords according to∏r
i=1 PX1|U=uri (m
(b)
0 )
; label them xr1(m
(b)
0 , m
′(b)
1 , m
′′(b)
1 ) for m
′(b)
1 ∈ J1, 2
rρ1K and
m
′′(b)
1 ∈ J1, 2
rρ2K. Note that m
(b)
1 = (m
′(b)
1 , m
′′(b)
1 ).
• For every m
(b)
0 , independently generate 2
rρ3 codewords according to
∏r
i=1 PX2|U=uri (m
(b)
0 )
;
label them xr2(m
(b)
0 , m
(b)
2 ), m
(b)
2 ∈ J1, 2
rρ3K.
In every block b ∈ J1, BK, assuming all messages are chosen independently and uniformly
in their respective sets and that both encoders use the same M
(b)
0 , our objective is to establish
conditions for ρ0, ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 such that:
1) messages M
′(b)
1 and M
′′(b)
1 can be decoded from X
r
1 knowing M
(b)
0 ;
2) message M
′′(b)
1 is nearly independent of Z
r
b ;
3) the distribution induced by the code, which we denote P¯Zr
b
to indicate that M
(b)
0 is assumed
known to both encoders, approximates Q⊗rZ .
The message M
′′(b)
1 is the part of M
(b)
1 that we wish to recycle toward the creation of M
(b+1)
0 ,
which itself constitutes the cooperating message between the two encoders. This dependency
between blocks can be hidden at the output of the channel by transmitting M
′′(b)
1 securely over
the wiretap channel with X1 as its input, the second encoder as the legitimate receiver, and
Z as the wiretapper. If we let P
(b)
e denote the average probability of error for decoding M
′(b)
1
and M
′′(b)
1 from (X
r
1 ,M
(b)
0 ), a standard argument shows that, when averaging over the randomly
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generated codes, E
(
P
(b)
e
)
< 2−αr for some α > 0 and all r large enough if
ρ1 + ρ2 < H(X1|U). (32)
If we let D(b) , D(P¯
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
||Q⊗rZ P¯M ′′(b)1
), a standard argument (see [33, Section III] for a
similar result with variational distance and Appendix B for more detailed steps) shows that,
when averaging over the randomly generated codes, E
(
D(b)
)
< 2−βr for some β > 0 and all r
large enough if
ρ0 > I(U ;Z), (33)
ρ0 + ρ1 > I(UX1;Z), (34)
ρ0 + ρ1 + ρ3 > I(X1X2;Z), (35)
ρ0 + ρ3 > I(UX2;Z). (36)
Let ǫ > 0 and set
ρ0 = I(U ;Z) + ǫ, (37)
ρ1 = I(X1;Z|U) + ǫ, (38)
ρ2 = H(X1|U)− I(X1;Z|U)− 2ǫ, (39)
ρ3 = I(X2;Z|UX1) + ǫ, (40)
which is compatible with constraints (32)-(34). The choice is also compatible with (35)
because I(UX1X2;Z) = I(X1X2;Z). The choice is finally compatible with (36) because
I(X2;Z|UX1) = H(X2|UX1) − H(X2|UX1Z) = H(X2|U) − H(X2|UX1Z) > H(X2|U) −
H(X2|UZ) = I(X2;Z|U). Hence, by an expurgation argument, for every b ∈ J1, BK there exists
a code for block b such that
P (b)e < 2
−α′r and D(b) < 2−β
′r (41)
for some α′, β ′ > 0 and all r large enough.
The codes hence obtained are chained across B blocks as follows. In Block 1, we assume that
the encoders have access to a common messageM
(1)
0 through some private common randomness
(see Remark 3 for justification). In block b > 1, we assume for now that Encoder 2 knows M
(b)
0 .
It is then able to form estimates M̂
′(b)
1 , M̂
′′(b)
1 , which are correct with high probability. Since we
have assumed that H(X1|U) > I(UX1;Z), we have ρ2 > ρ0 and an amount ρ0 of the rate ρ2 may
be recycled toward the creation of M
(b+1)
0 (see Fig. 2). Furthermore, for γ ∈ J0, 1K, an amount
γ(ρ2 − ρ0) may be recycled toward the creation of M
′(b+1)
1 , and an amount (1 − γ)(ρ2 − ρ0)
may be recycled toward the creation of M
(b+1)
2 . The key observations here are that (i) this
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M
(b)
0
M
(b)
2
M
(b+1)
2
M̂
′(b)
1
M̂
′′(b)
1
Z
r
b+1Z
r
b
X
r
2,b
X
r
2,b+1
X
r
1,b+1
X
r
1,b
M
′′(b)
1
M
′′(b+1)
1
M
′(b+1)
1M
′(b)
1
M̂
(b+1)
0
M̂
(b)
0
M
(b+1)
0
M̂
′′(b+1)
1
M̂
′(b+1)
1
block b+1block b
Fig. 3. Functional dependence graph for the block-Markov encoding scheme for the channel resolvability of the MAC with
strictly-causal cribbing.
procedure ensures that, with high probability, both Encoder 1 and Encoder 2 know messages
M
(b)
0 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 at the end of block b, so that they can coordinate their choices of M
(b+1)
0 ; and
(ii) the dependencies across blocks are only created through M
′′(b)
1 , which is nearly independent
of Zrb .
Before formalizing the reasoning above, note that the effective rate of new randomness for
Encoder 1 in block b is
R1 , ρ1 + ρ2 − γ(ρ2 − ρ0) = ρ1 + (1− γ)ρ2 + γρ0, (42)
and the effective rate for Encoder 2 is
R2 , ρ3 − (1− γ)(ρ2 − ρ0). (43)
Using the values of ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 chosen in (37)-(40), we may obtain all
2 rate pairs such that
R1 > ρ1 + ρ0 = I(UX1;Z) + 2ǫ,
R2 > ρ3 − ρ2 + ρ0 = I(X1X2;Z)−H(X1|U) + 4ǫ,
R1 +R2 > ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 − (ρ2 − ρ0) = I(X1X2;Z) + 3ǫ,
which is the desired rate region.
It remains to show that this coding scheme guarantees that D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z ) can be bounded
2For R1 we choose γ = 1 and for R2 we choose γ = 0, in each case finding the smallest single-user rate constraint so that
the entire rate region is captured. The sum-rate constraint is independent of γ.
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following the expansion in (31). First, note that for every b ∈ J2, BK,
I(Zrb ;Z
B,r
b+1) 6 I(Z
r
b ;M
′′(b)
1 M̂
′′(b)
1 Z
B,r
b+1) (44)
= I(Zrb ;M
′′(b)
1 M̂
′′(b)
1 ) (45)
since the Markov chain Zrb → M
′′(b)
1 M̂
′′(b)
1 → Z
B,r
b+1 holds as seen in the functional dependence
graph shown in Fig. 3. Next, note that
I(Zrb ;M
′′(b)
1 M̂
′′(b)
1 ) 6 I(Z
r
b ;M
′′(b)
1 ) +H(M̂
′′(b)
1 |M
′′(b)
1 ) (46)
(a)
6 D(P
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
||PZr
b
P
M
′′(b)
1
) +H(P (b)e ) + P
(b)
e rρ2 (47)
(b)
6 D(P
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
||Q⊗rZ PM ′′(b)1
) +H(P (b)e ) + P
(b)
e rρ2 (48)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality and (b) follows from
D(P
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
||PZr
b
P
M
′′(b)
1
) = D(P
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
||Q⊗rZ PM ′′(b)1
)− D(PZr
b
||Q⊗rZ ). (49)
Combining (45)-(49) into (31), we finally obtain
D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z ) 62
B∑
b=1
D(P
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
||Q⊗rZ PM ′′(b)1
) +B
(
H(P (b)e ) + P
(b)
e rρ2
)
. (50)
Finally, we show that D(P
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
||Q⊗rZ PM ′′(b)1
) is not too different from
D(P¯
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
||Q⊗rZ P¯M ′′(b)1
) = D(b), where we recall that P¯ is induced when both encoders
use M
(b)
0 , while P is induced when Encoder 1 uses M
(b)
0 and Encoder 2 uses an estimate M̂
(b)
0
derived from his estimate M̂
′′(b−1)
1 . The total variation V(PZr
b
M
′′(b)
1
, P¯
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
) satisfies
V(P
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
, P¯
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
) 6 V(P
Zr
b
M
(b)
0 M
′(b)
1 M
′′(b)
1 M̂
(b)
0 M
(b)
2
, P¯
Zr
b
M
(b)
0 M
′(b)
1 M
′′(b)
1 M
(b)
0 M
(b)
2
) (51)
= V(P
M
(b)
0 M̂
(b)
0
, P¯
M
(b)
0 M
(b)
0
) (52)
= 2P
(
M
(b)
0 6= M̂
(b)
0
)
(53)
6 2P(M ′′(b−1)1 6= M̂
′′(b−1)
1 ). (54)
Consequently, since P¯
M
′′(b−1)
1
= P
M
′′(b−1)
1
, we obtain
V(P
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
, Q⊗rZ PM ′′(b)1
) 6 V(P
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
, P¯
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
) + V(P¯
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
, Q⊗rZ PM ′′(b)1
)
6 2× 2−α
′r + 2−
β′
2
r. (55)
where we have used Pinsker’s inequality to bound the last term. To conclude that
D(P
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
||Q⊗rZ PM ′′(b)1
) vanishes, we recall the following result [34, Eq. (323)].
Lemma 1. Let P and Q be two distributions on a finite alphabet A such that P is absolutely
continuous with respect to (w.r.t.) Q. If µ , mina∈Q:Q(a)>0Q(a), we have
D(P ||Q) 6 log
(
1
µ
)
V(P,Q).
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Note that P
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
is absolutely continuous w.r.t. Q⊗rZ PM ′′(b)1
by definition of QZ and the code
construction. Hence, using (55) together with Lemma 1 shows that there exists η > 0 such that
for all r large enough
D(P
Zr
b
M
′′(b)
1
||Q⊗rZ PM ′′(b)1
) < 2−ηr. (56)
Substituting (56) and (41) into (50) shows the desired result.
Remark 3. Recall that some private common randomness is required to jump-start the block-
Markov encoding; this common randomness can be collected during a non-cooperative starting
phase in the following manner. The two encoders will start transmitting with rates R1 = H(X1)
and R2 = 0, which exceeds the single-user resolvability rate. Simultaneously, via the usual
arguments in the degraded wiretap channel M1 → X
n
1 → Z
n, one can convey 1
n
(I(M1;X
n
1 ) −
I(M1;Z
n)) = H(X1|Z) bits of randomness from User 1 to User 2 while keeping it independent
of Z and maintaining an i.i.d. distribution Q⊗n(z). By collecting this randomness for ρ0
H(X1|Z)
blocks, sufficient common randomness will be available to start the block-Markov process. The
difference of rates (R1, R2) in the starting phase will be amortized over B blocks, with B growing
without bound, thus the average rates remain as described. The concept of starting the block-
Markov transmission with a non-cooperative phase goes back to the inception of block-Markov
encoding [35].
Remark 4. The above mentioned initialization of block-Markov coding leaves open the possibility
that some Q(z) may be compatible with some joint distribution p(x1, x2) but incompatible with
all product distributions p(x1)p(x2). Such a Q(z) is valid for cooperative transmission but
cannot be generated during the non-cooperative initialization of block-Markov encoding. Thus,
for a more precise definition of the model for MAC with strictly causal cribbing, in the context
of resolvability, we are presented with three distinct choices: Either (a) some private shared
randomness (with rate that amortizes asymptotically to zero) is made available to the model,
or (b) the distribution Q(z) is limited to the set that can be generated via product distributions
p(x1)p(x2), or (c) the distribution of Z
n, although still i.i.d., is allowed to deviate from the target
Q(z) for a finite number of blocks at the beginning of transmission. Options (b) and (c) are both
reasonable for secrecy applications of resolvability; option (b) may affect secrecy rates.
2) Converse:
We consider a (2nR1, 2nR2, n) code such that D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z ) 6 ǫ. Then,
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nR1 = H(M1)
> I(M1;Z
n)
(a)
= I(M1, X
n
1 ;Z
n) (57)
> I(Xn1 ;Z
n)
= I(Xn1 , X
n
2 ;Z
n)− I(Xn2 ;Z
n|Xn1 )
(b)
>
∑
xn1
∑
xn2
∑
zn
P (xn1 , x
n
2 , z
n) log
W⊗n(zn|xn1 , x
n
2 )
PZn(zn)
−
∑
i
I(X2i;Zi|X1i, X
i−1
1 ) (58)
(c)
=
∑
xn1
∑
xn2
∑
zn
P (xn1 , x
n
2 , z
n) log
W⊗n(zn|xn1 , x
n
2 )
Q⊗nZ (z
n)
− D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z )−
∑
i
I(X2i;Zi|X1i, Ui)
(59)
>
∑
i
∑
ui
∑
x1i
∑
x2i
∑
zi
P (ui, x1i, x2i, zi) log
W (zi|x1i, x2i)
Q(zi)
−
∑
i
∑
ui
∑
x1i
∑
x2i
∑
zi
P (ui, x1i, x2i, zi) log
W (zi|x1i, x2i)
P (zi|x1i, ui)
− ǫ (60)
=
∑
i
∑
ui
∑
x1i
∑
x2i
∑
zi
P (ui, x1i, x2i, zi) log
P (zi|x1i, ui)
Q(zi)
− ǫ
=
∑
i
∑
ui
∑
x1i
∑
zi
P (ui, x1i, zi) log
P (zi|x1i, ui)
Q(zi)
− ǫ
=
∑
i
D(PUi,X1i,Zi||PUi,X1iQZi)− ǫ
=
∑
i
I(UiX1i;Zi) +
∑
i
D(PZi||QZ)− ǫ (61)
(d)
> nI(UQX1Q;ZQ|Q)− ǫ (62)
= nI(QUQX1Q;ZQ)− nI(Q;ZQ)− ǫ (63)
(e)
> nI(UX1;Z)− nǫ
′ (64)
where
(a) follows from the definition of the deterministic encoding functions in (3);
(b) follows from I(Xn2 ;Z
n|Xn1 ) 6
∑n
i=1 I(X2,i;Zi|X1,iX
i−1
1 ) since the channel is memoryless
and because conditioning does not increase entropy;
(c) follows setting Ui , X
i−1
1 ;
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(d) follows by introducing a random variable Q uniformly distributed on J1, nK and independent
of all others;
(e) follows by [3, Lemma VI.3] for some ǫ′ > 0 with limǫ→0 ǫ
′ = 0 and by setting U = (Q,UQ),
X1 = X1Q and Z = ZQ.
Notice that upon setting X2 = X2Q and recalling that the cribbing is strictly-causal such that
X2Q is a function of (M2, Q, UQ), and that the Markov chains M1, X1 → U → M2 and X1Q →
Q,UQ → X2Q hold, we have
PQUQX1QX2QZQ = PQUQPX1Q|UQQPX2Q|UQQWZQ|X1QX2Q , (65)
and
PUX1X2Z = PUPX1|UPX2|UWZ|X1X2 . (66)
Next, note that
nR2 = H(M2)
> H(M2|X
n
1 )
> I(M2;Z
n|Xn1 )
(a)
= I(M2, X
n
2 ;Z
n|Xn1 ) (67)
> I(Xn2 ;Z
n|Xn1 )
= I(Xn1 , X
n
2 ;Z
n)− I(Xn1 ;Z
n) (68)
=
∑
xn1
∑
xn2
∑
zn
P (xn1 , x
n
2 , z
n) log
W⊗n(zn|xn1 , x
n
2 )
PZn(zn)
− I(Xn1 ;Z
n)
>
∑
xn1
∑
xn2
∑
zn
P (xn1 , x
n
2 , z
n) log
W⊗n(zn|xn1 , x
n
2 )
Q⊗nZ (z
n)
− D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z )−H(X
n
1 )
>
∑
i
∑
x1i
∑
x2i
∑
zi
P (x1i, x2i, zi) log
W (zi|x1i, x2i)
Q(zi)
−
∑
i
H(X1i|Ui)− ǫ
=
∑
i
∑
i
∑
x1i
∑
x2i
P (x1i, x2i, zi) log
W (zi|x1i, x2i)
P (zi)
+ D(PZi ||QZ)−
∑
i
H(X1i|Ui)− ǫ
>
∑
i
I(X1i, X2i;Zi)−
∑
i
H(X1i|Ui)− ǫ
= nI(X1QX2Q;ZQ|Q)− nH(X1Q|UQQ)− ǫ
= nI(QX1QX2Q;ZQ)− nI(Q;ZQ)− nH(X1Q|UQQ)− ǫ
(b)
> nI(X1QX2Q;ZQ)− nH(X1Q|UQQ)− nǫ
′
November 29, 2018 DRAFT
25
= nI(X1X2;Z)− nH(X1|U)− nǫ
′ (69)
where (a) follows from the definition of the encoding function and (b) follows by [3, Lemma
VI.3] for some ǫ′ > 0 with limǫ→0 ǫ
′ = 0. Finally,
n(R1 +R2) = H(M1,M2)
> I(M1,M2;Z
n)
> I(Xn1 , X
n
2 ;Z
n) + D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z )− ǫ
> nI(X1, X2;Z)− nǫ
′
where we have merely repeated the steps in (68)-(69). To conclude the converse proof, we again
refer the reader to [3, Section VI.C] for the continuity of the resolvability region at ǫ→ 0.
D. Theorem 5: MAC with Causal Cribbing
1) Achievability:
The proof of the MAC with causal cribbing is similar to the MAC with strictly-causal cribbing,
however, we use a Shannon strategy to generate X2 rather than codewords [16]. Let T , X
|X1|
2
be the set of all strategies that map X1 into X2, and for t ∈ T denote by t(x1) ∈ X2 the image
of x1 ∈ X1. The MAC induced by the Shannon strategy is denoted by (X1 × T ,W
+
Z|X1,T
,Z)
where W+Z|X1,T , WZ|X1,X2=T (X1).
By Theorem 4, rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying the following conditions are achievable with
strictly-causal cribbing.
R1 > I(U,X1;Z), (70)
R2 > I(X1, T ;Z)−H(X1|U), (71)
R1 +R2 > I(X1, T ;Z). (72)
with H(X1|U) > I(U,X1;Z) for any joint distribution PUX1TZ , PUPX1|UPT |UW
+
Z|X1T
with
marginal QZ . Restricting the distribution to satisfy PUX1TZ , PUPX1PTW
+
Z|X1T
yields:
H(X1|U) = H(X1),
I(U,X1;Z) = I(X1;Z),
I(X1, T ;Z) = I(X1, X2, T ;Z) = I(X1, X2;Z),
and P (x1, x2, z) = P (x1)
∑
t:t(x1)=x2
P (t)W (z|x1, x2). This is possible because of the fact that
for an arbitrary distribution P ∗(x1, x2), there always exists a product distribution P (x1, t) =
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P (x1)P (t) such that P
∗(x1, x2) = P (x1)
∑
t:t(x1)=x2
P (t). This is achieved by choosing [16,
Eq. (44)]
P (x1) =
∑
x2
P ∗(x1, x2),
P (t) =
∏
x1
P ∗(x1, x2 = t(x1))
P (x1)
.
Note that the constraint H(X1|U) > I(U,X1;Z) is now automatically satisfied if H(X1|Z) > 0.
The achievability scheme presented thus far depends on H(X1|Z) > 0. The same achievable
rates can be attained for H(X1|Z) = 0, however, a different scheme is required for this extremal
case, which is presented below.
Consider a distribution P (x1, x2) = P (x1)P (x2|x1) such that
∑
x1,x2
P (x1, x2)W (z|x1, x2) =
QZ .
• Independently generate 2nR1 codewords xn1 each with probability P (x
n
1 ). Label them
xn1 (m1), m1 ∈ J1, 2
nR1K.
• For every xn1 (m1), independently generate 2
nR2 codewords xn2 each with probability
P (xn2 |x
n
1 (m1)) = P
⊗n
X2|X1(m1)
(xn2 |x
n
1 (m1)). Label them x
n
2 (x
n
1 (m1), m2), m2 ∈ J1, 2
nR2K.
For m1 ∈ J1, 2
nR1K and m2 ∈ J1, 2
nR2K, let Xn1 (m1) and X
n
2 (X
n
1 (m1), m2) denote random
variables representing the randomly generated codewords. The average KL divergence can be
bounded as:
E
(
D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z )
)
= E
(∑
zn
∑
xn1
P (xn1 , z
n) log
∑
xn1
P (xn1 , z
n)∑
xn1
Q⊗nX1,Z(x
n
1 , z
n)
)
(a)
6 E
(∑
zn
∑
xn1
P (xn1 , z
n) log
P (xn1 , z
n)
Q⊗nX1,Z(x
n
1 , z
n)
)
= E
(
D(PXn1 ,Zn||Q
⊗n
X1,Z
)
)
(b)
= E
(
D(PZn|Xn1 ||Q
⊗n
Z|X1
|PXn1 )
)
+ E
(
D(PXn1 ||P
⊗n
X1
)
)
(73)
where
QX1,Z =
∑
x2
P (x1, x2)W (z|x1, x2);
(a) follows by the log-sum inequality;
(b) follows from the chain rule of KL divergence.
Let R1 > H(X1), in which case the second term of (73) vanishes as n→∞ and the channel is
effectively a state-dependent point-to-point channel (Fig. 4). Using similar bounding techniques
November 29, 2018 DRAFT
27
Fig. 4. State-dependent point-to-point channel.
as those used earlier in this paper (e.g. the proof of (33)-(36)), the first term of (73) vanishes as
n→∞ if R2 > I(X2;Z|X1). Since H(X1|Z) = 0, the achievable region is
R1 > H(X1) = I(X1;Z),
R2 > I(X2;Z|X1) = I(X1, X2;Z)−H(X1),
R1 +R2 > H(X1) + I(X2;Z|X1) = I(X1, X2;Z).
2) Converse:
Since the MAC with causal cribbing is a special case of the MAC with non-causal cribbing, it
follows that the converse of the latter holds for the causal cribbing scenario.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper develops inner and outer bounds for the resolvability rates of the multiple-access
channel with cribbing that is either non-causal, causal, strictly causal, or in the form of degraded
message sets. The derived inner and outer bounds are tight except for the strictly causal case.
The key insight of this paper and the corresponding analytical contribution involves the hiding
of the cooperation among the encoders so that the dependencies created by cooperation are
undetectable at the channel output. This is made possible because the cribbing mechanism, even
with a strict-causality constraint, creates an effective wiretap channel and allows the exchange
of secret information. In the context of channel resolvability, this secret information plays the
role of randomness that can be reused for cooperation without impacting the desired output
approximation. Then, deriving secrecy from channel resolvability, achievable strong secrecy rates
were derived for MAC wiretap channels with cribbing.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF CONVEXITY OF RESOLVABILITY REGIONS
A. Convexity of MAC with Degraded Message Sets
Assume that (R
(1)
1 , R
(1)
2 ) and (R
(2)
1 , R
(2)
2 ) are achievable, which implies the existence of two
distributions P
(1)
X1,X2,Z
and P
(2)
X1,X2,Z
with marginal QZ such that,
R
(1)
1 > I(X
(1)
1 ;Z
(1)),
R
(1)
1 +R
(1)
2 > I(X
(1)
1 , X
(1)
2 ;Z
(1)),
and
R
(2)
1 > I(X
(2)
1 ;Z
(2)),
R
(2)
1 +R
(2)
2 > I(X
(2)
1 , X
(2)
2 ;Z
(2)).
Let P
(3)
X1,X2|Z
= λP
(1)
X1,X2|Z
+(1−λ)P
(2)
X1,X2|Z
for λ ∈ J0, 1K and P
(3)
X1|Z
= λP
(1)
X1|Z
+(1−λ)P
(2)
X1|Z
.
Note that P
(3)
X1,X2,Z
resulting from a convex combination of P
(1)
X1,X2,Z
and P
(2)
X1,X2,Z
exists unlike
the MAC with non-cooperating encoders, where the convex combination does not necessarily
factorize into a product distribution.
From the convexity of I(X1, X2;Z) with respect to PX1,X2|Z and the convexity of I(X1;Z)
with respect to PX1|Z , it follows that for a fixed QZ:
I(X
(3)
1 ;Z
(3)) 6 λI(X(1)1 ;Z
(1)) + (1− λ)I(X
(2)
1 ;Z
(2)),
I(X
(3)
1 , X
(3)
2 ;Z
(3)) 6 λI(X(1)1 , X
(1)
2 ;Z
(1)) + (1− λ)I(X
(2)
1 , X
(2)
2 ;Z
(2)).
Therefore we have
I(X
(3)
1 ;Z
(3)) 6 λR(1)1 + (1− λ)R
(2)
1 ,
I(X
(3)
1 , X
(3)
2 ;Z
(3)) 6 λ(R(1)1 +R
(1)
2 ) + (1− λ)(R
(2)
1 +R
(2)
2 ).
which implies that
(
λR
(1)
1 + (1 − λ)R
(2)
1 , λR
(1)
2 + (1 − λ)R
(2)
2
)
is inside the achievable region
defined by P
(3)
X1,X2,Z
.
B. Convexity of MAC with Non-Causal/Causal Cribbing
Similar to the MAC with degraded message sets, assume that (R
(1)
1 , R
(1)
2 ) and (R
(2)
1 , R
(2)
2 ) are
achievable, which implies the existence of two distributions P
(1)
X1,X2,Z
and P
(2)
X1,X2,Z
with marginal
QZ such that,
R
(1)
1 > I(X
(1)
1 ;Z
(1)),
R
(1)
2 > I(X
(1)
1 , X
(1)
2 ;Z
(1))−H(X
(1)
1 ),
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R
(1)
1 +R
(1)
2 > I(X
(1)
1 , X
(1)
2 ;Z
(1)),
and
R
(2)
1 > I(X
(2)
1 ;Z
(2)),
R
(1)
2 > I(X
(2)
1 , X
(2)
2 ;Z
(2))−H(X
(2)
1 ),
R
(2)
1 +R
(2)
2 > I(X
(2)
1 , X
(2)
2 ;Z
(2)).
Let P
(3)
X1,X2|Z
= λP
(1)
X1,X2|Z
+(1−λ)P
(2)
X1,X2|Z
for λ ∈ J0, 1K. Then P
(3)
X1|Z
= λP
(1)
X1|Z
+(1−λ)P
(2)
X1|Z
and P
(3)
X1
= λP
(1)
X1
+ (1− λ)P
(2)
X1
.
From the convexity of I(X1, X2;Z) with respect to PX1,X2|Z , the convexity of I(X1;Z) with
respect to PX1|Z for a fixed QZ and the concavity of H(X1) with respect to PX1 :
I(X
(3)
1 ;Z
(3)) 6 λI(X(1)1 ;Z
(1)) + (1− λ)I(X
(2)
1 ;Z
(2)),
H(X
(3)
1 ) > λH(X
(1)
1 ) + (1− λ)H(X
(2)
1 ),
I(X
(3)
1 , X
(3)
2 ;Z
(3)) 6 λI(X(1)1 , X
(1)
2 ;Z
(1)) + (1− λ)I(X
(2)
1 , X
(2)
2 ;Z
(2)).
Therefore we have
I(X
(3)
1 ;Z
(3)) 6 λR(1)1 + (1− λ)R
(2)
1 ,
I(X
(3)
1 , X
(3)
2 ;Z
(3))−H(X
(3)
1 ) 6 λR
(1)
2 + (1− λ)R
(2)
2 ,
I(X
(3)
1 , X
(3)
2 ;Z
(3)) 6 λ(R(1)1 +R
(1)
2 ) + (1− λ)(R
(2)
1 +R
(2)
2 ).
which implies that
(
λR
(1)
1 + (1 − λ)R
(2)
1 , λR
(1)
2 + (1 − λ)R
(2)
2
)
is inside the achievable region
defined by P
(3)
X1,X2,Z
.
C. Convexity of MAC with Strictly-Causal Cribbing
To prove the convexity of the inner bound, assume that (R
(1)
1 , R
(1)
2 ) and (R
(2)
1 , R
(2)
2 ) are achiev-
able, which implies the existence of two distributions P
(1)
U,X1,X2,Z
= P
(1)
U P
(1)
X1|U
P
(1)
X2|U
WZ|X1,X2 and
P
(2)
U,X1,X2,Z
= P
(2)
U P
(2)
X1|U
P
(2)
X2|U
WZ|X1,X2 with marginal QZ such that,
R
(1)
1 > I(U
(1), X
(1)
1 ;Z
(1)),
R
(1)
2 > I(X
(1)
1 , X
(1)
2 ;Z
(1))−H(X
(1)
1 |U
(1)),
R
(1)
1 +R
(1)
2 > I(X
(1)
1 , X
(1)
2 ;Z
(1)),
with H(X
(1)
1 |U
(1)) > I(U (1), X
(1)
1 ;Z
(1)),
and
R
(2)
1 > I(U
(2), X
(2)
1 ;Z
(2)),
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R
(1)
2 > I(X
(2)
1 , X
(2)
2 ;Z
(2))−H(X
(2)
1 |U
(2)),
R
(2)
1 +R
(2)
2 > I(X
(2)
1 , X
(2)
2 ;Z
(2)),
with H(X
(2)
1 |U
(2)) > I(U (2), X
(2)
1 ;Z
(2)).
For λ ∈ J0, 1K, let Q ∈ {1, 2} with Pr(Q = 1) = λ and Pr(Q = 2) = 1 − λ. Define
U (3) , (U (Q), Q), X(3)1 , X
(Q)
1 , X
(3)
2 , X
(Q)
2 and Z
(3) , Z(Q). Let Q, (U (1), X(1)1 , X
(1)
2 , Z
(1))
and (U (2), X
(2)
1 , X
(2)
2 , Z
(2)) be independent so that P
(3)
U,X1,X2,Z
= λP
(1)
U,X1,X2,Z
+ (1− λ)P
(2)
U,X1,X2,Z
can be written as P
(3)
U,X1,X2,Z
= P
(3)
U P
(3)
X1|U
P
(3)
X2|U
WZ|X1,X2 . From the definition of the random
variables:
H(X
(3)
1 |U
(3)) = λH(X
(1)
1 |U
(1)) + (1− λ)H(X
(2)
1 |U
(2)).
For a fixed QZ , we have P
(3)
X1,X2|Z
= λP
(1)
X1,X2|Z
+ (1− λ)P
(2)
X1,X2|Z
and P
(3)
U,X1|Z
= λP
(1)
U,X1|Z
+
(1− λ)P
(2)
U,X1|Z
. From the convexity of I(U,X1;Z) with respect to PU,X1|Z and the convexity of
I(X1, X2;Z) with respect to PX1,X2|Z:
I(U (3), X
(3)
1 ;Z
(3)) 6 λI(U (1), X(1)1 ;Z
(1)) + (1− λ)I(U (2)X
(2)
1 ;Z
(2)),
I(X
(3)
1 , X
(3)
2 ;Z
(3)) 6 λI(X(1)1 , X
(1)
2 ;Z
(1)) + (1− λ)I(X
(2)
1 , X
(2)
2 ;Z
(2)).
Therefore, we have
I(U (3), X
(3)
1 ;Z
(3)) 6 λR(1)1 + (1− λ)R
(2)
1 ,
I(X
(3)
1 , X
(3)
2 ;Z
(3))−H(X
(3)
1 |U
(3)) 6 λR(1)2 + (1− λ)R
(2)
2 ,
I(X
(3)
1 , X
(3)
2 ;Z
(3)) 6 λ(R(1)1 +R
(1)
2 ) + (1− λ)(R
(2)
1 +R
(2)
2 ).
and
H(X
(3)
1 |U
(3)) = λH(X
(1)
1 |U
(1)) + (1− λ)H(X
(2)
1 |U
(2))
> λI(U (1), X
(1)
1 ;Z
(1)) + (1− λ)I(U (2)X
(2)
1 ;Z
(2))
> I(U (3), X(3)1 ;Z
(3)).
which implies that
(
λR
(1)
1 + (1 − λ)R
(2)
1 , λR
(1)
2 + (1 − λ)R
(2)
2
)
is inside the achievable region
defined by P
(3)
U,X1,X2,Z
. The convexity of the outer bound is proven similarly but without the
entropy constraint H(X1|U) > I(U,X1;Z).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF EQUATIONS (33)-(36)
For m0 ∈ J1, 2
nρ0K, m′1 ∈ J1, 2
nρ1K and m2 ∈ J1, 2
nρ3K, let U r(m0), X1(m0, m
′
1, m
′′
1) and
X2(m0, m2) denote the random variables representing the randomly generated codewords.
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E(D(P¯
Zr
b
,M
′′(b)
1
||Q⊗rZ P¯M ′′(b)1
))
= E
∑
m′′1 ,z
r
b
P¯ (m′′1, z
r
b ) log
P¯ (m′′1, z
r
b )
P¯
M
′′(b)
1
(m′′1)Q
⊗r
Z (z
r)
= E
∑
m′′1
P¯ (m′′1)
∑
zr
b
P¯ (zrb |m
′′
1) log
P¯ (zrb |m
′′
1)
Q⊗rZ (z
r)
= E
∑
m′′1
P¯ (m′′1)
∑
zr
b
∑
i,j,k
W⊗r(zrb |U
r(i), Xr1(i, j,m
′′
1), X
r
2(i, k))
2r(ρ0+ρ1+ρ3)
log
∑
i′,j′,k′
W⊗r(zrb |U
r(i′), Xr1(i
′, j′, m′′1), X
r
2(i
′, k′))
2r(ρ0+ρ1+ρ3)Q⊗rZ (z
r)
(a)
6
1
2r(ρ0+ρ1+ρ3)
∑
m′′1
P¯ (m′′1)
∑
i,j,k
∑
zr
b
∑
ur(i)
∑
xr1(i,j,m
′′
1 )
∑
xr2(i,k)
P¯ (ur(i), xr1(i, j,m
′′
1), x
r
2(i, k), z
r)
logE\(i,j,k)
∑
i′,j′,k′
W⊗r(zrb |U
r(i′), Xr1(i
′, j′, m′′1), X
r
2(i
′, k′))
2r(ρ0+ρ1+ρ3)Q⊗rZ (z
r)
6
1
2r(ρ0+ρ1+ρ3)
∑
m′′1
P¯ (m′′1)
∑
i,j,k
∑
zr
b
∑
ur(i)
∑
xr1(i,j,m
′′
1 )
∑
xr2(i,k)
P¯ (ur(i), xr1(i, j,m
′′
1), x
r
2(i, k), z
r)
logE\(i,j,k)
1
2r(ρ0+ρ1+ρ3)Q⊗rZ (z
r)
(
W⊗r(zr|ur(i), xr1(i, j,m
′′
1), x
r
2(i, k))
+
∑
j′ 6=j
k′ 6=k
W⊗r(zr|ur(i), Xr1(i, j
′, m′′1), X
r
2(i, k
′))
+
∑
k′ 6=k
W⊗r(zr|ur(i), xr1(i, j,m
′′
1), X
r
2(i, k
′))
+
∑
j′ 6=j
W⊗r(zr|ur(i), Xr1(i, j
′, m′′1), x
r
2(i, k))
+
∑
i′ 6=i
j′,k′
W⊗r(zr|U r(i′), Xr1(i
′, j′, m′′1), X
r
2(i
′, k′))
)
6
1
2r(ρ0+ρ1+ρ3)
∑
m′′1
P¯ (m′′1)
∑
i,j,k
∑
zr
b
∑
ur(i)
∑
xr1(i,j,m
′′
1 )
∑
xr2(i,k)
P¯ (ur(i), xr1(i, j,m
′′
1), x
r
2(i, k), z
r)
log
1
2r(ρ0+ρ1+ρ3)Q⊗rZ (z
r)
(
W⊗r(zr|ur(i), xr1(i, j,m
′′
1), x
r
2(i, k))
+
∑
j′ 6=j
k′ 6=k
P¯⊗r(zr|ur(i)) +
∑
k′ 6=k
P¯⊗r(zr|ur(i), xr1(i, j,m
′′
1))
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+
∑
j′ 6=j
P¯⊗r(zr|ur(i), xr2(i, k)) + 1
)
= Ψ1 +Ψ2
(74)
where
(a) follows by Jensen’s inequality.
Ψ1 ,
1
2r(ρ0+ρ1+ρ3)
∑
m′′1
P¯ (m′′1)
∑
i,j,k
∑
(ur(i),xr1(i,j,m
′′
1 ),x
r
2(i,k),z
r
b
)∈T rǫ (PU,X1,X2,Z)
P¯ (ur(i), xr1(i, j,m
′′
1), x
r
2(i, k), z
r) log
1
2r(ρ0+ρ1+ρ3)Q⊗rZ (z
r)(
W⊗r(zr|ur(i), xr1(i, j,m
′′
1), x
r
2(i, k)) +
∑
j′ 6=j
k′ 6=k
P¯⊗r(zr|ur(i))
+
∑
k′ 6=k
P¯⊗r(zr|ur(i), xr1(i, j,m
′′
1)) +
∑
j′ 6=j
P¯⊗r(zr|ur(i), xr2(i, k)) + 1
)
6 log
( 2−r(1−ǫ)H(Z|X1,X2)
2r(ρ0+ρ1+ρ3)2−r(1+ǫ)H(Z)
+
2−r(1−ǫ)H(Z|U)
2rρ02−r(1+ǫ)H(Z)
+
2−r(1−ǫ)H(Z|U,X1)
2r(ρ0+ρ1)2−r(1+ǫ)H(Z)
+
2−r(1−ǫ)H(Z|U,X2)
2r(ρ0+ρ3)2−r(1+ǫ)H(Z)
+ 1
)
6 log
(
2−r(ρ0+ρ1+ρ3−I(X1,X2;Z)−2ǫH(Z)) + 2−r(ρ0−I(U ;Z)−2ǫH(Z)) + 2−r(ρ0+ρ1−I(U,X1;Z)−2ǫH(Z))
+ 2−r(ρ0+ρ3−I(U,X2;Z)−2ǫH(Z)) + 1
)
Ψ2 ,
∑
m′′1
P¯ (m′′1)
∑
i
∑
j
∑
k
∑
(ur(i),xr1(i,j,m
′′
1 ),x
r
2(i,k),z
r
b
)/∈T rǫ (PU,X1,X2,Z )
P¯ (ur(i), xr1(i, j,m
′′
1), x
r
2(i, k), z
r) log
1
2r(ρ0+ρ1+ρ3)Q⊗rZ (z
r)(
W⊗r(zr|ur(i), xr1(i, j,m
′′
1), x
r
2(i, k)) +
∑
j′ 6=j
k′ 6=k
P¯⊗r(zr|ur(i))
+
∑
k′ 6=k
P¯⊗r(zr|ur(i), xr1(i, j,m
′′
1)) +
∑
j′ 6=j
P¯⊗r(zr|ur(i), xr2(i, k)) + 1
)
6 2|U||X1||X2||Z|e
−rǫ2µUX1X2Zr log(
4
µZ
+ 1)
where
µZ = min
z∈Z
Q(z)
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µUX1X2Z = min
(u,x1,x2,z)∈(U ,X1,X2,Z)
Q(u, x1, x2, z)
Combining the bounds on Ψ1 and Ψ2, E(D(P¯Zr
b
,M
′′(b)
1
||Q⊗rZ P¯M ′′(b)1
))
r→∞
−−−→ 0 when (33)-(36)
are satisfied.
APPENDIX C
ACHIEVABILITY PROOFS OF THE STRONG SECRECY REGION FOR MAC WITH CRIBBING
A. Achievability: Strong Secrecy of MAC with Degraded Message Sets
Consider a distribution P (x1, x2) = P (x1)P (x2|x1) such that
∑
x1,x2
P (x1, x2)W (z|x1, x2) =
QZ(z).
Code Construction:
• Independently generate 2n(R1+R
′
1) codewords xn1 each with probability P (X
n
1 ) = P
⊗n
X1
(xn1 ).
Label them xn1 (m1, m
′
1), m1 ∈ J1, 2
nR1K and m′1 ∈ J1, 2
nR′1K.
• For every xn1 (m1, m
′
1), independently generate 2
n(R2+R′2) codewords xn2 each with prob-
ability P (xn2 |x
n
1 (m1, m
′
1)) = P
⊗n
X2|X1
(xn2 |x
n
1 (m1, m
′
1)). Label them x
n
2 (m1, m
′
1, m2, m
′
2),
m2 ∈ J1, 2
nR2K and m′2 ∈ J1, 2
nR′2K.
Encoding: To sendm1, Encoder 1 transmits x
n
1 (m1, m
′
1). To sendm2, Encoder 2 cooperatively
sends xn2 (m1, m
′
1, m2, m
′
2). m
′
1 and m
′
2 are independently chosen at random from J1, 2
nR′1K and
J1, 2nR
′
2K respectively.
Decoding: The decoder finds (m1, m
′
1, m2, m
′
2) such that
(xn1 (m1, m
′
1), x
n
2 (m1, m
′
1, m2, m
′
2), y
n) ∈ T (n)ǫ (PX1,X2,Y ).
Probability of error analysis: Using standard arguments, the probability of error averaged
over all codebooks vanishes exponentially with n if
R2 +R
′
2 < I(X2; Y |X1) (75)
R1 +R
′
1 +R2 +R
′
2 < I(X1, X2; Y ) (76)
Secrecy analysis: We will show that the information leakage, averaged over all code-
books vanishes, exponentially with n. We use the results of Theorem 2 to bound
EM1,M2[D(PZn|M1,M2||Q
⊗n
Z )] such that the channel output distribution at the wiretapper is, on av-
erage, independent of the transmitted messages and follows the i.i.d distribution Q⊗nZ . This is suf-
ficient to ensure secrecy because I(M1,M2;Z
n) can be bounded by EM1,M2[D(PZn|M1,M2 ||Q
⊗n
Z )],
as follows:
I(M1,M2;Z
n) = D(PM1,M2,Zn||PM1,M2PZn) (77)
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=
∑
m1,m2,zn
PM1,M2,Zn(m1, m2, z
n) log
PM1,M2,Zn(m1, m2, z
n)
PM1,M2(m1, m2)PZn(z
n)
(78)
=
∑
m1,m2
PM1,M2(m1, m2)D(PZn|M1,M2||PZn) (79)
(a)
6 EM1,M2
(
D(PZn|M1,M2||Q
⊗n
Z )
)
, (80)
where (a) follows by adding D(PZn||Q
⊗n
Z ) > 0 to (79). With PZ|M1M2(z|m1, m2) =
2−n(R
′
1+R
′
2)
∑
i,jW
⊗n(zn|x1(m1, i), x2(m1, i,m2, j)) and applying Theorem 2 to (80),
I(M1,M2;Z
n) vanishes exponentially with n if
R′1 > I(X1;Z) (81)
R′1 +R
′
2 > I(X1, X2;Z) (82)
Combining (75), (76), (81) and (82), and using Fourier-Motzkin elimination, the following
rate region is achievable
R2 < I(X2;Z|X1), (83)
R1 +R2 < I(X1, X2;Z). (84)
B. Achievability: Strong Secrecy of MAC with Non-Causal Cribbing
Consider a distribution P (x1, x2) = P (x1)P (x2|x1) such that
∑
x1,x2
P (x1, x2)W (z|x1, x2) =
QZ(z).
Code Construction:
• Independently generate 2n(R1+R
′
1) codewords xn1 each with probability P (X
n
1 ) = P
⊗n
X1
(xn1 ).
Label them xn1 (m1, m
′
1), m1 ∈ J1, 2
nR1K and m′1 ∈ J1, 2
nR′1K.
• For every xn1 (m1, m
′
1), independently generate 2
n(R2+R′2) codewords xn2 each with probability
P (xn2 |x
n
1 (m1, m
′
1)) = P
⊗n
X2|X1
(xn2 |x
n
1 (m1, m
′
1)). Label them x
n
2 (x
n
1 (m1, m
′
1), m2, m
′
2), m2 ∈
J1, 2nR2K and m′2 ∈ J1, 2
nR′2K.
We assume that each message is chosen independently and uniformly from its corresponding
set. As a result of cribbing, Encoder 2 knows xn1 in advance, therefore before transmission, it
finds (mˆ1, mˆ
′
1) such that (x
n
1 (mˆ1, mˆ
′
1), x
n
1 ) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ (PX1,X1) where (mˆ1, mˆ
′
1) are the estimates of
(m1, m
′
1).
Encoding: To send m1, Encoder 1 sends x
n
1 (m1, m
′
1). To send m2, Encoder 2 cooperatively
sends xn2 (x
n
1 (mˆ1, mˆ
′
1), m2, m
′
2).
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Decoding at the receiver: The decoder finds ( ˆˆm1, ˆˆm
′
1,
ˆˆm2, ˆˆm
′
2) such that
(xn1 (
ˆˆm1, ˆˆm
′
1), x
n
2 (x
n
1 (
ˆˆm1, ˆˆm
′
1),
ˆˆm2, ˆˆm
′
2), y
n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ (PX1,X2,Y ).
Probability of error analysis and secrecy analysis: We follow similar steps as the cognitive
MAC case. Using standard arguments to bound the probability of error and using the resolvability
results of Theorem 3 we get
R1 +R
′
1 < H(X1) (85)
R2 +R
′
2 < I(X2; Y |X1) (86)
R1 +R
′
1 +R2 +R
′
2 < I(X1, X2; Y ) (87)
R′1 > I(X1;Z) (88)
R′2 > I(X1, X2;Z)−H(X1) (89)
R′1 +R
′
2 > I(X1, X2;Z) (90)
Note that (89) is implied by (85) and (90). Using Fourier-Motzkin elimination, the following
rate region is achievable
R1 < H(X1)− I(X1;Z), (91)
R2 < I(X2; Y |X1), (92)
R1 +R2 < I(X1, X2; Y )− I(X1, X2;Z). (93)
C. Achievability: Strong Secrecy of MAC with Strictly-Causal Cribbing
The interesting challenge being addressed in this section is that the decoding at output Y and
secrecy at output Z have dissonant requirements under strictly causal cribbing. For decoding,
Willems and van der Muelen [16] proposed a block-Markov superposition coding technique
where all the information carried by the cribbing signal is used as cloud centers for the purpose
of cooperation between the two encoders. The tightness of the inner and outer bounds in [16]
strongly suggests (via continuity arguments in joint probability distributions) that leaving out any
part of cribbing information from cooperation can incur a rate loss for decoding at Y . On the
other hand, the resolvability results of this paper strongly suggest that for simulating a desired
probability distribution at Z, it is beneficial to have a local randomness component at X1 that
does not take part in cooperation with X2. The contribution of this section is to produce a coding
strategy that reconciles these two dissonant requirements.
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 
Fig. 5. Functional dependence graph for the block-Markov encoding scheme for the MAC with strictly-causal cribbing.
We begin by informally describing the main idea of this section with a simplified notation.
The codebook for X1 is driven by three variables: (M1,M
′
1,M
′′
1 ). M1 is the secret message, and
M ′1,M
′′
1 are uniformly distributed dithers. The encoder for X2 will decode the cribbing signal
X1 and use all its three components as cloud center for the next transmission, which we call
M0,M
′
0,M
′′
0 . This, as mentioned earlier, is crucial for decoding at Y . Now we introduce an
additional constraint (enforced by proper assignment of rates) so that Z is independent of M ′0,
one of the dither components of X1. Thus, as far as the distribution of Z is concerned, one of
the two dither components of X1 is local (private) to X1 and is not used by X2. To elaborate
further, due to the imposed independence, the cloud centers that only differ in their M ′0 index
must give rise to the same distribution in Z, therefore Encoder 2 has been effectively enjoined
from cooperation or coordination with part of the dither of Encoder 1, which for all practical
purposes becomes local to X1 as far as the eavesdropper is concerned. We now make these ideas
precise in full detail, which includes direct reference to block indices as well as accounting for
discrepancies between message/dither indices and their estimated values.
We use a combination of block-Markov encoding and backward decoding. Independently
and uniformly distributed messages m
(b)
1 ∈ J1, 2
rR1K and m
(b)
2 ∈ J1, 2
rR2K will be sent over
B blocks. Each block consists of r transmissions so that n = rB. Consider a distribution
P (u, x1, x2) = P (u)P (x1|u)P (x2|u) such that
∑
u,x1,x2
P (u, x1, x2)W (z|x1, x2) = QZ(z).
Code Construction: In each block b ∈ J1, BK:
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• Independently generate 2r(R1+ρ
′
1+ρ
′′
1 ) codewords urb each with probability P (u
r) = P⊗rU (u
r).
Label them ur(m
(b)
0 , m
′(b)
0 , m
′′(b)
0 ), m
(b)
0 ∈ J1, 2
rR1K, m
′(b)
0 ∈ J1, 2
rρ′1K and m
′′(b)
0 ∈ J1, 2
rρ′′1 K.
• For every ur(m
(b)
0 , m
′(b)
0 , m
′′(b)
0 ), independently generate 2
r(R1+ρ′1+ρ
′′
1 ) codewords xr1b each
with probability P (xr1|u
r(m
(b)
0 , m
′(b)
0 , m
′′(b)
0 )) = P
⊗r
X1|U
(xr1|u
r(m
(b)
0 , m
′(b)
0 , m
′′(b)
0 )). Label them
xr1(m
(b)
0 , m
′(b)
0 , m
′′(b)
0 , m
(b)
1 , m
′(b)
1 , m
′′(b)
1 ), m
(b)
1 ∈ J1, 2
rR1K, m
′(b)
1 ∈ J1, 2
rρ′1K and m
′′(b)
1 ∈
J1, 2rρ
′′
1 K.
• For every ur(m
(b)
0 , m
′(b)
0 , m
′′(b)
0 ), independently generate 2
r(R2+ρ2) codewords xr2b each
with probability P (xr2|u
r(m
(b)
0 , m
′(b)
0 , m
′′(b)
0 )) = P
⊗r
X2|U
(xr2|u
r(m
(b)
0 , m
′(b)
0 , m
′′(b)
0 )). Label them
xr2(m
(b)
0 , m
′(b)
0 , m
′′(b)
0 , m
(b)
2 , m
′(b)
2 ), m
(b)
2 ∈ J1, 2
rR2K and m
′(b)
2 ∈ J1, 2
rρ2K.
We intend to use these codebooks in the following manner:
1) Block Markov encoding via M
(b)
0 = M
(b−1)
1 , M
′(b)
0 = M
′(b−1)
1 and M
′′(b)
0 = M
′′(b−1)
1 ;
2) M
(b)
1 , M
′(b)
1 and M
′′(b)
1 can be decoded from X
r
1b knowing (M
(b)
0 ,M
′(b)
0 ,M
′′(b)
0 );
3) {M
(1)
1 , . . . ,M
(B)
1 } and {M
(1)
2 , . . . ,M
(B)
2 } are secret from {Z
r
1 , . . . , Z
r
B};
4) M
′′(b)
1 is the common randomness to be used by both encoders in block b+ 1;
5) M
′(b)
1 is local randomness used by Encoder 1 and M
′(b)
2 is local randomness used by
Encoder 2;
6) The messages M
(b)
0 , M
′(b)
0 , M
′′(b)
0 , M
(b)
1 , M
′(b)
1 , M
′′(b)
1 , M
(b)
2 and M
′(b)
2 can be decoded at
the receiver from Y rb and the messages decoded in future blocks b + 1 to B (backward
decoding).
As a result of cribbing, after block b, Encoder 2 finds estimates (mˆ
(b)
1 , mˆ
′(b)
1 , mˆ
′′(b)
1 ) for
(m
(b)
1 , m
′(b)
1 , m
′′(b)
1 ) such that
(ur(mˆ
(b)
0 , mˆ
′(b)
0 , mˆ
′′(b)
0 ), x
r
1(mˆ
(b)
0 , mˆ
′(b)
0 , mˆ
′′(b)
0 , mˆ
(b)
1 , mˆ
′(b)
1 , mˆ
′′(b)
1 ), x
r
1b) ∈ T
(r)
ǫ (PU,X1,X1). (94)
where (mˆ
(b)
0 , mˆ
′(b)
0 , mˆ
′′(b)
0 ) = (mˆ
(b−1)
1 , mˆ
′(b−1)
1 , mˆ
′′(b−1)
1 ).
Encoding: We apply block-Markov encoding as follows. In block b, the encoders send:
xr1b = x
m
1 (m
(b)
0 , m
′(b)
0 , m
′′(b)
0 , m
(b)
1 , m
′(b)
1 , m
′′(b)
1 )
xr2b = x
m
2 (mˆ
(b)
0 , mˆ
′(b)
0 , mˆ
′′(b)
0 , m
(b)
2 , m
′(b)
2 )
where (m
(b)
0 , m
′(b)
0 , m
′′(b)
0 ) = (m
(b−1)
1 , m
′(b−1)
1 , m
′′(b−1)
1 ) and (mˆ
(b)
0 , mˆ
′(b)
0 , mˆ
′′(b)
0 ) =
(mˆ
(b−1)
1 , mˆ
′(b−1)
1 , mˆ
′′(b−1)
1 ). We also assume that the encoders and decoder have access to
(M
(1)
0 ,M
′(1)
0 ,M
′′(1)
0 ,M
(B)
1 ,M
′(B)
1 ,M
′′(B)
1 ,M
(B)
2 ,M
′(B)
2 ) through private common randomness.
Decoding at the receiver: The legitimate receiver waits until all B blocks are transmitted
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and then performs backward decoding. The decoder first finds ( ˆˆm
(B)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′(B)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′′(B)
0 ) such that
(ur( ˆˆm
(B)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′(B)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′′(B)
0 ), x
r
1(
ˆˆm
(B)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′(B)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′′(B)
0 ,
ˆˆm
(B)
1 ,
ˆˆm
′(B)
1 ,
ˆˆm
′′(B)
1 ),
xr2(
ˆˆm
(B)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′(B)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′′(B)
0 ,
ˆˆm
(B)
2 ,
ˆˆm
′(B)
2 ), y
r
B) ∈ T
(r)
ǫ (PU,X1,X2,Y ).
Assuming that (m
(B)
0 , m
′(B)
0 , m
′′(B)
0 ), (m
(B−1)
0 , m
′(B−1)
0 , m
′′(B−1)
0 ), . . . , (m
(b+1)
0 , m
′(b+1)
0 , m
′′(b+1)
0 )
have been decoded, the decoder sets ( ˆˆm
(b)
1 ,
ˆˆm
′(b)
1 ,
ˆˆm
′′(b)
1 ) = (
ˆˆm
(b+1)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′(b+1)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′′(b+1)
0 ) and finds
( ˆˆm
(b)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′(b)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′′(b)
0 ) and (
ˆˆm
(b)
2 ,
ˆˆm
′(b)
2 ) such that
(ur( ˆˆm
(b)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′(b)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′′(b)
0 ), x
r
1(
ˆˆm
(b)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′(b)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′′(b)
0 ,
ˆˆm
(b)
1 ,
ˆˆm
′(b)
1 ,
ˆˆm
′′(b)
1 ),
xr2(
ˆˆm
(b)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′(b)
0 ,
ˆˆm
′′(b)
0 ,
ˆˆm
(b)
2 ,
ˆˆm
′(b)
2 ), y
r
b) ∈ T
(r)
ǫ (PU,X1,X2,Y ).
Probability of error analysis: Using the arguments for error analysis from [36, Lemma 4],
the probability of error of each block vanishes exponentially with r and in turn vanishes across
blocks if
R1 + ρ
′
1 + ρ
′′
1 < H(X1|U), (95)
R2 + ρ2 < I(X2; Y |X1, U), (96)
R1 + ρ
′
1 + ρ
′′
1 +R2 + ρ2 < I(X1, X2; Y ). (97)
Secrecy analysis: Let P¯ be the probability induced when both encoders use
(M
(b)
0 ,M
′(b)
0 ,M
′′(b)
0 ). Let P be the probability when Encoder 1 uses (M
(b)
0 ,M
′(b)
0 ,M
′′(b)
0 ) and
Encoder 2 uses the estimate (Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 , Mˆ
′′(b)
0 ). For the secrecy analysis we find conditions
so that I(M
(b)
0 ,M
(b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(b)
2 ;Z
r
b ) vanishes exponentially with r. This is
motivated by:
• (M
(b)
1 ,M
(b)
0 , Mˆ
(b)
0 ,M
(b)
2 ) are the Encoder 1 secret message in the present and the past, the
estimate of the latter (at Encoder 2), and Encoder 2 secret message, which must be kept
secret from Zrb , obviously.
• (M
(b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 ) must be kept independent of Z
r
b according to the functional dependence
graph (Fig. 5) to ensure the distribution of Z remains i.i.d. across blocks
• Mˆ
′(b)
0 is kept independent from Z
r
b to allow Encoder 1 to possess a local randomness that
is separate from the common randomness shared with Encoder 2: Resolvability analysis
showed us that having a local randomness at Encoder 1 can be beneficial for achievable
rates.
Let I¯(·; ·) be the mutual information according to P¯
I¯(M
(b)
0 ,M
(b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(b)
2 ;Z
r
b )
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= D(P¯
M
(b)
0 M
(b)
1 M
′(b)
1 M
′′(b)
1 Mˆ
(b)
0 Mˆ
′(b)
0 M
(b)
2 Z
r
b
||P¯
M
(b)
0 M
(b)
1 M
′(b)
1 M
′′(b)
1 Mˆ
(b)
0 Mˆ
′(b)
0 M
(b)
2
P¯Zr
b
)
6 D(P¯
M
(b)
0 M
(b)
1 M
′(b)
1 M
′′(b)
1 Mˆ
(b)
0 Mˆ
′(b)
0 M
(b)
2 Z
r
b
||P¯
M
(b)
0 M
(b)
1 M
′(b)
1 M
′′(b)
1 Mˆ
(b)
0 Mˆ
′(b)
0 M
(b)
2
Q⊗rZ ) (98)
D(P¯
M
(b)
0 M
(b)
1 M
′(b)
1 M
′′(b)
1 Mˆ
(b)
0 Mˆ
′(b)
0 M
(b)
2 Z
r
b
||P¯
M
(b)
0 M
(b)
1 M
′(b)
1 M
′′(b)
1 Mˆ
(b)
0 Mˆ
′(b)
0 M
(b)
2
Q⊗rZ ) can be shown, similar
to Appendix B, to vanish exponentially with r if:
ρ′′1 > I(U ;Z), (99)
ρ′1 + ρ
′′
1 > I(U,X1;Z), (100)
ρ′1 + ρ
′′
1 + ρ2 > I(X1, X2;Z), (101)
ρ′′1 + ρ2 > I(U,X2;Z). (102)
Define M (a:b) = {M (a), . . . ,M (b)} and Z(1:b),r = {Zr1 , . . . , Z
r
b}.
I¯(M
(1:b)
1 ,M
(1:b)
2 ;Z
(1:b),r)
6 I¯(M (b)0 ,M
(1:b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(1:b)
2 ;Z
(1:b),r) (103)
= I¯(M
(b)
0 ,M
(1:b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(1:b)
2 ;Z
r
b )
+ I¯(M
(b)
0 ,M
(1:b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(1:b)
2 ;Z
(1:b−1),r|Zrb ) (104)
= I¯(M
(b)
0 ,M
(b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(b)
2 ;Z
r
b )
+ I¯(M
(1:b−1)
1 ,M
(1:b−1)
2 ;Z
r
b |M
(b)
0 ,M
(b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(b)
2 )
+ I¯(M
(b)
0 ,M
(1:b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(1:b)
2 ;Z
(1:b−1),r|Zrb ) (105)
6 I¯(M (b)0 ,M
(b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(b)
2 ;Z
r
b )
+ I¯(M
(1:b−1)
1 ,M
(1:b−1)
2 ;M
′′(b−1)
1 , Z
r
b |M
(b)
0 ,M
(b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(b)
2 )
+ I¯(M
(b)
0 ,M
(1:b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(1:b)
2 ;Z
(1:b−1),r|Zrb ) (106)
(a)
= I¯(M
(b)
0 ,M
(b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(b)
2 ;Z
r
b )
+I¯(M
(1:b−1)
1 ,M
(1:b−1)
2 ;Z
r
b |M
(b)
0 ,M
(b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(b)
2 ,M
(b−1)
1 ,M
′(b−1)
1 ,M
′′(b−1)
1 )
+ I¯(M
(b)
0 ,M
(1:b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(1:b)
2 ;Z
(1:b−1),r|Zrb ) (107)
(b)
6 2−αr + I¯(M (b)0 ,M
(1:b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(1:b)
2 ;Z
(1:b−1),r|Zrb ) (108)
6 2−αr
+I¯(M
(b)
0 ,M
(1:b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 ,Mˆ
(b)
0 ,Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(1:b)
2 , Z
r
b ,M
(b−1)
0 ,M
′(b−1)
1 ,M
′′(b−1)
1 ,Mˆ
(b−1)
0 , Mˆ
′(b−1)
0 ;Z
(1:b−1),r)
(109)
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(c)
= 2−αr + I¯(M
(b−1)
0 ,M
(1:b−1)
1 ,M
′(b−1)
1 ,M
′′(b−1)
1 , Mˆ
(b−1)
0 , Mˆ
′(b−1)
0 ,M
(1:b−1)
2 ;Z
(1:b−1),r) (110)
(d)
6 b× 2−αr
(111)
Therefore I¯(M1,M2;Z
n) 6 B × 2−αr where,
(a) holds because M
(b)
0 = Mˆ
(b)
0 = M
(b−1)
1 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 = M
′(b−1)
1 and M
′′(b−1)
1 is independent of
(M
(1:b−1)
1 ,M
(1:b−1)
2 ) by construction;
(b) holds because I¯(M
(b)
0 ,M
(b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(b)
2 ;Z
r
b ) 6 2
−αr by (98)-(102) and
M
(1:b−1)
1 ,M
(1:b−1)
2 → M
(b)
0 ,M
(b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(b)
2 ,M
(b−1)
1 ,M
′(b−1)
1 ,M
′′(b−1)
1 →
Zrb (see Fig. 5);
(c) holds because M
(b)
0 ,M
(b)
1 ,M
′(b)
1 ,M
′′(b)
1 , Mˆ
(b−1)
0 , Mˆ
′(b)
0 ,M
(b)
2 , Z
r
b →
M
(b−1)
0 ,M
(1:b−1)
1 ,M
′(b−1)
1 ,M
′′(b−1)
1 , Mˆ
(b−1)
0 , Mˆ
′(b−1)
0 ,M
(1:b−1)
2 → Z
(1:b−1),r (see Fig. 5).
(d) holds by repeating (103)-(110) b− 1 times.
Next we show that I(M
(1:b)
1 ,M
(1:b)
2 ;Z
(1:b),r) is not too different from I¯(M
(1:b)
1 ,M
(1:b)
2 ;Z
(1:b),r).
I(M
(1:b)
1 ,M
(1:b)
2 ;Z
(1:b),r)
= D(P
M
(1:b)
1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r ||PM (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2
PZ(1:b),r)
(a)
6 D(P
M
(1:b)
1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r ||PM (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2
Q⊗brZ )
=
∑
m
(1:b)
1 ,m
(1:b)
2 ,z
(1:b),r
P (m
(1:b)
1 , m
(1:b)
2 , z
(1:b),r) log
P (m
(1:b)
1 , m
(1:b)
2 , z
(1:b),r)
P¯ (m
(1:b)
1 , m
(1:b)
2 , z
(1:b),r)
+
∑
m
(1:b)
1 ,m
(1:b)
2 ,z
(1:b),r
P (m
(1:b)
1 , m
(1:b)
2 , z
(1:b),r) log
P¯ (m
(1:b)
1 , m
(1:b)
2 , z
(1:b),r)
P (m
(1:b)
1 , m
(1:b)
2 )Q
⊗br
Z
+ D(P¯
M
(1:b)
1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b,r)||PM (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2
Q⊗brZ )− D(P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r ||PM (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2
Q⊗brZ )
= D(P
M
(1:b)
1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r ||P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r) + D(P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r ||PM (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2
Q⊗brZ )
+
∑
m
(1:b)
1 ,m
(1:b)
2 ,z
(1:b),r
(P
M
(1:b)
1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r − P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r) log
P¯ (m
(1:b)
1 , m
(1:b)
2 , z
(1:b),r)
P (m
(1:b)
1 , m
(1:b)
2 )Q
⊗br
Z
(b)
6 D(P
M
(1:b)
1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r ||P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r) + D(P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r ||P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2
Q⊗brZ )
+ log
1
µ
V(P
M
(1:b)
1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r , P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
b,r)
(c)
6 2 log
1
µ
V(P
M
(1:b)
1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r , P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r) + D(P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
b,r ||P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2
P¯Z(1:b),r)
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+ D(P¯Z(1:b),r ||Q
⊗br
Z )
= 2 log
1
µ
V(P
M
(1:b)
1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r , P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r) + I¯(M
(1:b)
1 ,M
(1:b)
2 ;Z
(1:b),r)
+ D(P¯Z(1:b),r ||Q
⊗br
Z ) (112)
where
(a) follows by adding D(PZb,r ||Q
⊗br
Z );
(b) follows because P¯
M
(1:b)
1 ,M
(1:b)
2
= P
M
(1:b)
1 ,M
(1:b)
2
, (P
M
(1:b)
1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r − P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r) 6
|P
M
(1:b)
1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r − P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r | and by defining µ , minzb,r Q
⊗br
Z (z
b,r);
(c) follows by Lemma 1 and because D(P¯
M
(1:b)
1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
(1:b),r ||P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2
Q⊗brZ ) =
D(P¯
M
(1:b)
1 M
(1:b)
2 Z
b,r ||P¯M (1:b)1 M
(1:b)
2
P¯Z(1:b),r) + D(P¯Z(1:b),r ||Q
⊗br
Z ).
The first and third terms of (112) vanish exponentially with br similar to Section V-C.
We now derive an achievable rate region by choosing values for ρ′1, ρ
′′
1 , ρ2, R1 and R2
that satisfy the constraints for secrecy and probability of error. We find it more convenient to
separately derive achievable rate regions under the two conditions H(X1|U) ≶ I(U,X1; Y ), and
then merge them.
When H(X1|U) > I(U,X1; Y ), The following rates satisfy all error and secrecy constraints:
ρ′′1 = I(U ;Z) + ǫ,
ρ′1 = I(X1;Z|U) + ǫ,
ρ2 = I(X2;Z|X1, U) + ǫ,
R1 = H(X1|U)− I(U,X1;Z)− 2ǫ,
R2 = I(X1, X2; Y )− I(X2;Z|X1, U)−H(X1|U)− ǫ,
and the same is true for the following rates:
ρ′′1 = I(U,X2;Z) + ǫ,
ρ′1 = I(X1, X2;Z)− I(U,X2;Z) + ǫ,
ρ2 = ǫ,
R1 = I(X1, X2; Y )− I(X2; Y |X1, U)− I(X1, X2;Z)− 2ǫ,
R2 = I(X2; Y |X1, U)− ǫ.
Considering the above two corner points, the following rate region is achievable.
R1 6 H(X1|U)− I(U,X1;Z)
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R2 6 I(X2; Y |X1, U)
R1 +R2 6 I(X1, X2; Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)
which is identical to Eq. (22) absent one of the two sum rate constraints.
When H(X1|U) 6 I(U,X1; Y ), the following rates satisfy all error and secrecy constraints:
ρ′′1 = I(U ;Z) + ǫ,
ρ′1 = I(X1;Z|U) + ǫ,
ρ2 = I(X2;Z|X1, U) + ǫ,
R1 = H(X1|U)− I(U,X1;Z)− 2ǫ,
R2 = I(X2; Y |X1, U)− I(X2;Z|X1, U)− ǫ,
and the same is true for the following rates:
ρ′′1 = I(U,X2;Z) + ǫ,
ρ′1 = I(X1, X2;Z)− I(U,X2;Z) + ǫ,
ρ2 = ǫ,
R1 = H(X1|U)− I(X1, X2;Z)− 2ǫ,
R2 = I(X2; Y |X1, U)− ǫ.
Considering the above two corner points, the following rate region is achievable.
R1 6 H(X1|U)− I(U,X1;Z)
R2 6 I(X2; Y |X1, U)
R1 +R2 6 H(X1|U) + I(X2; Y |X1, U)− I(X1, X2;Z)
which is again identical to Eq. (22) absent one of the two sum rate constraints.
Thus far, we have two achievable rate regions for the two conditions H(X1|U) ≶ I(U,X1; Y ),
and the overall achievable rate region is usually specified as the union of the two. However, a
more compact representation is possible via the following useful information inequality:
H(X1|U) ≶ I(U,X1; Y ) ⇒ H(X1|U) + I(X2; Y |X1, U) ≶ I(X1, X2; Y )
which holds because of I(X1, X2; Y ) = I(U,X1, X2; Y ) and the chain rule. It then follows that
the smaller of the two derived sum rate constraints is always active. Therefore we can simplify
the expression of the achievable region by using the intersection of the two sum rate constraints.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 3.
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D. Achievability: Strong Secrecy of MAC with Causal Cribbing
This proof is similar to the achievability proof of the strictly-causal case presented in
Appendix C-C and we again use a Shannon strategy for generatingX2 rather than codewords [16].
Using the same notation as in Section V-D for the strategies T , we find from Proposition 3 that
rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying the following secrecy are achievable with strictly-causal cribbing:
R1 < H(X1|U)− I(U,X1;Z),
R2 < I(T ; Y |X1, U),
R1 +R2 < I(X1, T ; Y )− I(X1, T ;Z),
for any joint distribution PUX1TY Z , PUPX1|UPT |UW
+
Y Z|X1T
with marginal QZ . Restricting the
distribution to satisfy PUX1TY Z , PUPX1PTW
+
Y Z|X1T
yields:
H(X1|U) = H(X1),
I(U,X1;Z) = I(X1;Z)
I(T ; Y |X1, U) = I(T,X2; Y |X1, U) = I(X2; Y |X1),
I(X1, T ; Y ) = I(X1, X2, T ; Y ) = I(X1, X2; Y ),
I(X1, T ;Z) = I(X1, X2, T ;Z) = I(X1, X2;Z).
and P (x1, x2, y, z) = P (x1)
∑
t:t(x1)=x2
P (t)W (y, z|x1, x2). To complete the proof, we again
follow [16, Eq. (44)] to note that for an arbitrary distribution P ∗(x1, x2) there exists a product
distribution P (x1, t) = P (x1)P (t) such that P
∗(x1, x2) = P (x1)
∑
t:t(x1)=x2
P (t).
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